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Is There a Future for Future Claimants
After Amchem Products, Inc. v. Windsor?
Alex Raskolnikov
I. INTRODUCTION: THE PROBLEM OF FUTURE CLAIMS
In September 1990, the Chief Justice of the U.S. Supreme Court appointed
an Ad Hoc Committee on Asbestos Litigation in response to what was widely
perceived as a "'failure of the federal court system to perform one of its vital
roles in our society."" Less than a year later, the Judicial Panel on Multidistrict
Litigation transferred all untried asbestos cases to the eastern district of
Pennsylvania for pretrial proceedings.2 In January 1993, these proceedings
produced a global settlement class action of historic proportions, which the
district court eventually approved in August 1994.1 In May 1996, in Georgine
v. Amchem Products, Inc.,4 the Third Circuit vacated the settlement and
remanded the case to the district court with directions to decertify the class. One
month later, the Fifth Circuit affirmed a $1.535 billion global settlement
between Fibreboard Corp. and a class virtually identical to that decertified by
the Third Circuit.5 In June 1997, the Supreme Court decided Anichen Products,
Inc. v. Windsor,6 in which it affirmed the Georgine decision, and vacated the
Fifth Circuit settlement.7 Decades of asbestos litigation,8 years of effort by the
1. In re Fibreboard Corp., 893 F.2d 706, 708 (5th Cir. 1990) (quoting the distict court).
2. See In re Asbestos Prods. Liab. Litig. (No. VI). 771 F. Supp. 415. 422-24 (J.P.M.L. 1991). The
transfer followed five previous rejections by the Multidistrict Litigation (MDL) Panel. See id. at 417.
3. See Georgine v. Amchem Prods., Inc., 157 F.R.D. 246 (E.D. Pa. 1994). vacated. 83 F.3d 610 (3d
Cir. 1996), aff'd sub nom. Amchem Prods., Inc. v. Windsor, 117 S. Ct. 2231 (1997). A global settlement
is a settlement binding all future claimants. There is no standard definition of the term "future claimants"
See John C. Coffee, Jr., Class Wars: The Dilemma of the Mass Torti Class Action. 95 CoLUst. L REV.
1343, 1424 n.320 (1995). In this Note, I define future claimants as persons who may. at any time in the
future, bring an action against a defendant based on the claimants' or their relatives' contact with the
defendant's products (a contact which itself may not have yet occurred).
4. 83 F.3d 610 (3d Cir. 1996), aff'd sub nom. Amchem. 117 S. Ct. 2231 (1997).
5. See In re Asbestos Litig. (Flanagan v. Ahearn). 90 F.3d 963 (5th Cir. 1996). vacated, 117 S. Ct,
2503 (1997).
6. 117 S. Ct. 2231 (1997). Throughout this Note. I refer to the asbestos settlement affirmed by the
district court in Pennsylvania as Georgine. I refer to the Supreme Court's decision reversing this settlement
as Amchem (Robert A. Georgine was no longer a party to the case at the time it reached the Supreme
Court). This is to distinguish the Pennsylvania settlement from the Supreme Court decision that established
standards for all global settlements.
7. See Aheam, 117 S. Ct. at 2503.
8. The first paradigmatic mass tort action against the asbestos industry was decided in 1973 See Borel
v. Fibreboard Paper Prods. Corp.. 493 F.2d 1076 (5th Cir. 1973).
2545
The Yale Law Journal
most sophisticated members of the mass tort bar,9 and millions of dollars in
transaction costs were rendered moot by the same Court that had recognized the
crisis and called for an extraordinary response seven years before.
The Court rejected the settlement for two reasons. First, it held that
common questions of law or fact did not predominate and thus the Georgine
class failed to satisfy the requirement of Rule 23(b)(3).' ° Second, the Court
concluded that because the named plaintiffs could not adequately represent the
interests of the class, the action failed the adequacy prong of Rule 23(a)."
Almost as important as the holding itself were the opinion's dicta. Justice
Ginsburg, writing for the Court, expressed skepticism about whether class
action notice to a class of the kind presented in the case could ever satisfy
Rule 23 or the Constitution, t2 though she stopped short of holding that the
notice violated due process. The Court also reserved its opinion about the
standing of future claimants to bring suit.13 This exercise of judicial restraint
helps to put some of the Amchem language in perspective. The Court
announced that "any overarching dispute about the health consequences of
asbestos exposure cannot satisfy the Rule 23(b)(3) predominance standard."' 4
It emphasized that the "specifications of [Rule 23(b)(3)(D)]-those designed
to protect absentees by blocking unwarranted or overbroad class
definitions-demand undiluted, even heightened, attention in the settlement
context."'5 Finally, the Court did more than merely reverse Georgine, the
principal case, on the narrowest grounds. It insured that at least one of its
holdings applied to the Fifth Circuit's decision as well.' 6 The Court clearly
raised the standards used to evaluate class action settlements in mass torts. The
question that remains is whether these new standards can ever be satisfied.
The Court rejected a long-awaited solution to the mass tort crisis in part
because the legions of asbestos victims may still have alternative avenues for
relief. One such alternative is congressional action. While the Court clearly
prefers this alternative, 7 such action is highly unlikely.'8 This may be a
9. See Peter H. Schuck, Mass Torts: An Institutional Evolutionist Perspective, 80 CORNELL L. REV.
941, 951-52 (1995) (noting the experience, specialization, and sophistication of the mass tort bar on both
sides).
10. See Amchem, 117 S. Ct. at 2250 (citing FED. R. Civ. P. 23(b)(3)).
11. See id. (citing FED. R. CIv. P. 23(a)(4)).
12. See id. at 2252.
13. See id. at 2244.
14. Id. at 2250 (emphasis added).
15. Id. at 2248 (emphasis added).
16. Because Ahearn was a mandatory class action under Rule 23(b)(l)(B), it did not have to satisfy
Rule 23(b)(3)'s predominance requirement as the Georgine class did.
17. See Amchem, 117 S. Ct. at 2252 ('The argument is sensibly made that a nationwide administrative
claims processing regime would provide the most secure, fair, and efficient means of compensating victims
of asbestos exposure.").
18. The judiciary has made concerted and continuous attempts to shift the burden of mass tort
administration onto Congress, with little success. See, e.g., Georgine v. Amchem Prods., Inc., 83 ,3d 610,
634 (3d Cir. 1996) (suggesting ways in which Congress may deal with asbestos litigation), aff'd sub nom.
Amchem, 117 S. Ct. 2231 (1997); JUDICIAL CONFERENCE OF THE U.S. AD HOC COMM. ON ASBESTOS
2546 [Vol. 107: 2545
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blessing, not a curse. The only congressional venture into the mass tort arena
to date 9 has been a well-documented disaster.20 A second alternative is
bankruptcy, which may be the only judicial solution available in the absence
of class actions.2' Indeed, many have argued that bankruptcy is a better
remedy for mass torts than class actions like Ahearn and Georgine. 2
An insight into the Court's views on the continuing vitality of settlement
class actions to resolve mass torts and on whether bankruptcy would be
preferable to any class action may come from discerning the Court's main
concerns in Amchem. This Note asserts that the Court was fundamentally
concerned with the (mis)treatment of future claimants. 24 To be sure, the
Amchem holding was not expressly based on the grossly disparate treatment
of future claimants in the Georgine global class as compared to the present
claimants in the "inventory settlements" negotiated by the same parties almost
LmG., REPORT OF AD Hoc COMMITrEE ON ASBESTOS LITIGATION 1, 27-35 (1991) (hereinafter ASBESTOS
REPORT] (urging Congress to resolve the asbestos crisis). Recent developments concerning the global
tobacco settlement, however, may be a sign that Congress has decided to take a more active role in
resolving at least some products liability disputes. See. e.g.. Hatch Wants Tobacco Bill Before Recess,
WASH. PoST, Oct. 30, 1997, at A9; Tobacco Funds Allocation Adds Settlement Pressure. WAsH. PosT. Feb.
3, 1998, at A8.
19. See Black Lung Benefits Act, 30 U.S.C. §§ 901-945 (1994). The Act created a benefits program
for miners afflicted with pneumoconiosis. See generally Robert L. Ramsey & Robert S. Habermann. The
Federal Black Lung Program-The View from the Top, 87 W. VA. L REV. 575 (1985).
20. The black lung program is widely considered to be a "fiasco." Schuck. supra note 9. at 970; see
also Peter H. Schuck, The Worst Should Go First: Deferral Registries in Asbestos Litigation. 15 HARv. J.L.
& PUB. POL'Y 541, 552 n.46 (1992) (citing studies critiquing the program).
21. A broad revision of Rule 23--another possible altemative-secms highly unlikely. The Advisory
Committee to the Judicial Conference of the United States has been working on such amendments for the
past several years. Its proposed revision was published in 1996 for public comment. See Proposed Rules.
167 F.R.D. 523, 524 (1996). So far, only the least controversial change has made it to the next step A new
Rule 23(0, allowing immediate appeal of a trial cour's decision certifying or decertifying a class, was
submitted and approved by the Judicial Conference. See Judicial Conference Approves Single Change to
Federal Rule Governing Class Action Suits, 66 U.S.L.W. 2182 (Sept. 30, 1997). The rule still requires
approval from the U.S. Supreme Court and Congress to go into effect on December 1. 1998. as planned
See id. The more controversial and far-reaching amendments, including a new Rule 23(bX4) that would
have allowed certification of a settlement-only class even though the class might not have been certifiable
for trial under Rule 23(b)(3), never made it out of the Advisory Committee. though the Committee decided
to review its decision in light of Amchem. See id. at 2183. The support for far-reaching changes aimed at
adapting Rule 23 to a mass torts context seems to be dwindling, however. Even the Chzurperson of the
Advisory Committee now admits that the federal rules simply cannot resolve the future-claims problem
See id.
22. In re Asbestos Litig. (Flanagan v. Ahearn). 90 F.3d 963 (5th Cir. 1996). vacated. 117 S. CL 2503
(1997).
23. See, e.g., Coffee, supra note 3, at 1457-61 (arguing that bankruptcy gives better procedural and
substantive protection to mass tort victims, provides clearer rules, and better handles conflict-of-interests
problems); Ralph R. Mabey & Peter A. Zisser. Improving Treatment of Future Claims. The Unfinished
Business Left by the Manville Amendments. 69 AM. BANKR. L.I. 487. 488 (1995) (explaining that
bankruptcy is "the most effective framework for treating future claims"); Francis E. McGovem. The
Defensive Use of Federal Class Actions in Mass Torts. 39 ARtZ. L. REv. 595. 610 (1997) (concluding that
bankruptcy better protects victims while class actions favor management and shareholders); John A.
Siliciano, Mass Torts and the Rhetoric of Crisis, 80 CORNELL L. REV. 990. 1002-05 (1995) (dismissing the
views of those who argue that bankruptcy is inappropriate in mass torts, and insisting that it is the logical
and correct resolution for many mass tort defendants).
24. For a definition of the term "future claimants." see supra note 3.
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simultaneously. But the Court was certainly aware of this disparity. 5 And as
I try to demonstrate, it was this disparity that prompted the Court to act.
The Court had had many chances to consider mass tort settlements-and
it had always declined to do so.26 What was different this time? Georgine and
Ahearn combined for the first time a global settlement-i.e., a settlement
binding all future plaintiffs-with a complete exclusion of present claimants
from the class. As Judge Smith noted in his Ahearn dissent, this combination
had the effect (if not the purpose) of excluding all those who were likely to
receive notice, monitor the class action, and oppose the class attorneys'
conflicts and other inadequacies.27 Conceivably, the Court abandoned its
noninterventionist posture because it could not allow abrogation of future
claimants' rights on such a grand scale. The Court's uncompromising stand
vis-h-vis the Rule 23(b)(3) predominance standard supports this conclusion.
Class actions under Rule 23(b)(3) are the only ones that are optional for
present plaintiffs. Because future claimants cannot opt out, at least at the front
end, 28 23(b)(3) class actions have the highest potential for unequal treatment
of present and future claimants. Consequently, it is revealing that the Court
went to the greatest lengths to make sure that these class actions fail by using
the broadest possible language.29  Finally, the Court emphasized its
dissatisfaction with a "settlement [that] includes no adjustment for inflation;
in which only a few claimants per year can opt out at the back end; and in
which loss-of-consortium claims are extinguished with no compensation." 3
All of these concerns relate explicitly to the protection of future claimants.
If one of the main purposes behind the Amchem decision was to protect
future claimants, the future of mass tort class actions becomes clearer. Whether
the new class action standards can ever be satisfied, and whether class actions
will ever be preferable to bankruptcy, depends on whether one can devise a
regime that would, while satisfying other requirements, guarantee appropriate
protection for future claimants. In this Note, I propose just such a solution, one
that is a more fair and efficient way to deal with mature mass torts.3' I call
25. See Amchem Prods., Inc. v. Windsor, 117 S. Ct. 2231, 2239 (1997).
26. See, e.g., In re School Asbestos Litig. (Celotex Corp. v. School Dist.), 789 F.2d 996 (3d Cir.), cert.
denied, 479 U.S. 852 (1986); In re Northern Dist. of Cal. Dalkon Shield IUD Prods. Liab. Litig. (A.H.
Robins Co. v. Abed), 693 F2d 847 (9th Cir. 1982), cert. denied, 459 U.S. 1171 (1983); In re Federal
Skywalk Cases (Stover v. Rau), 680 F.2d 1175 (8th Cir.), cert. denied, 459 U.S. 988 (1982); In re "Agent
Orange" Prod. Liab. Litig. (Chapman v. Dow Chem. Co.), 635 F.2d 987 (2d Cir. 1980), cert. denied, 454
U.S. 1128 (1981).
27. See Ahearn, 90 F.3d at 1000 (Smith, J., dissenting).
28. Usually, global settlements provide for so-called back-end opt outs to alleviate concerns about
inequitable treatment of future claimants and due process. See, e.g., id. at 972-73 (majority opinion). Unlike
a front-end opt out by plaintiffs who are aware of the pending class action and decide not to participate,
the back-end opt out is a right preserved for future claimants who will be bound by the settlement to
withdraw and litigate their individual cases at some future date. For further discussion of back-end opt outs,
see infra notes 153-159 and accompanying text.
29. See Amchem, 117 S. Ct. at 2249-50.
30. Id. at 2251.
31. For a definition of the term "mature mass tort," see infra text accompanying notes 34-35.
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this solution a global limited fund mandatory settlement class action with a
modified pro rata distribution of benefits for present and fiture claimants.
My proposal does not provide future claimants with absolute protection or
discover a way to resolve all the uncertainties facing the parties to a global
settlement. No realistic proposal could accomplish these goals. No matter how
successful our judicial system is in discovering "the truth," no matter how
advanced our science is in unearthing "the facts," it is impossible to know
everything one must know to insure that a global settlement is entirely "fair"
to future claimants. Nevertheless, there are ways to make global settlements
fairer. My proposal suggests one such way.
Because most of the discussion in this Note focuses on future claimants,
it is helpful to define who they are, when they appear, and what threats they
face. Part II addresses these questions. In Part I, I explain my proposal. In
Section Ill.A, I clarify the substance of the pro rata rule and argue that it is
fair, responsive to the Court's concerns in Amchem, beneficial to some present
parties, and much more protective of future plaintiffs' interests than is the
current regime. Another advantage of the pro rata rule, I argue, is its
consistency with the law of bankruptcy, which is highly relevant at the global
settlement stage. I go on, in Section EIL.B, to introduce a new interpretation of
the Rule 23(b)(1) limited fund concept, which I assert brings many advantages
both to future claimants and to mass tort participants generally. Such class
actions may also be acceptable to the courts, as they are both similar to and
clearly different from bankruptcy. In Section llI.C, I argue for a mandatory
class action with no opt outs at the front or the back end. Recognizing serious
problems with this proposal, I attempt to demonstrate that its benefits, at least
within my overall scheme, outweigh its costs. I conclude Part In by discussing
the modifications to the pro rata rule made necessary by great indeterminacies
external to particular mass torts. Reversing the overall thrust of the Note, I
suggest that future claimants should bear most of such external risks. Part IV
argues that the proposed regime is preferable to bankruptcy, mainly because
it creates incentives to initiate global settlement negotiations at the right time.
I conclude by suggesting that just before the Georgine and Ahearn settlements
were negotiated, asbestos was ripe for the treatment proposed in this Note. I
also argue that recent procedural and substantive legal changes, especially
those at the state level, have created an environment in which an increasing
number of mass torts will soon become prime candidates for my proposal.
II. THE CuRRENT REGIME-UNPROTECTED FUTURE CLAIMANTS
The Georgine and Aheam settlements are the latest and the most vivid
examples of the grossly inadequate protection given future claimants under the
current class action regime. The settlements exploited both factual and legal
uncertainties surrounding future claimants to reduce disproportionately their
1998] 2549
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share of the overall recoveries. It is necessary to examine both the nature of
these uncertainties and their magnitudes in order to see how my proposal gives
better protection to future claimants by bringing more certainty to the system.
Future claimants (or "futures") are a very diverse group. They share most
of the differences typical of present claimants and, in addition, have their own
unique distinctions. It is common today to identify two types of present
claimants: large and small.32 Future claimants can be large and small as well.
They can also be near, intermediate, or far.33 To complicate the picture
further, future claims usually do not appear contemporaneously with present
ones, but only as a mass tort matures.
The term "mature tort" was coined by Professor Francis McGovern, who
defines it as a situation "where there has been full and complete discovery,
multiple jury verdicts, and a persistent vitality in the plaintiffs' contentions."'
As he explains, "Typically at the mature stage, little or no new evidence will
be developed, significant appellate review of any novel legal issues has been
concluded, and at least one full cycle of trial strategies has been exhausted. '35
Developed in the 1970s, McGovern's framework has proven to be useful in
determining whether a mass tort is ready for a settlement. It needs to be
modified, however, to account for a phenomenon of the 1990s-the global
settlement. The criteria needed to complement McGovern's definition are
focused on future claims. In particular, when a mature mass tort is ready for
a global settlement (when it is "globally mature"), the following information
should be well estimated, or at least more than speculative: (1) the existence
of future claims; (2) their overall number; (3) their approximate time
distribution in the future (including the approximate date that they will cease
to appear); and, finally, (4) the ratio of small to large claimants within the
future claimants' class.
These factors are unlikely to be known with equal certainty. The first
factor will become apparent early on as a mass tort matures.36 Indeed, by the
time a tort reaches global maturity, there will be no doubt about the futures'
existence. The fourth factor will often be the next to develop. There are two
reasons that the small-large ratio among the futures will likely be known with
32. See, e.g., Coffee, supra note 3, at 1351. Large claimants are seriously injured people who have
the potential to obtain substantial recoveries. These claims are worth pursuing on individual bases. The
opposite is true for small claimants. Their claims are so small that it is inefficient to resolve them In
individual suits. Yet their claims are meritorious, and in the aggregate, they create the potential for a
significant gross recovery.
33. See id. at 1424. Near futures are persons who have suffered a legally cognizable injury, but have
not yet filed a suit. Intermediate futures are those who have been exposed to a toxic or defective substance
or product but have not yet manifested an injury. Far futures are persons who have not yet been exposed
or injured but will be in the future as a result of the defendant's past conduct.
34. Francis E. McGovern, Resolving Mature Mass Tort Litigation, 69 B.U. L. REV. 659, 659 (1989).
35. Id.
36. See, e.g., Jenkins v. Raymark Indus., 782 F.2d 468, 470 (5th Cir. 1986) (recognizing the existence
of future claims in asbestos litigation).
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certainty. First, it is reasonable to assume that this ratio will be similar to that
among the present plaintiffs. Second, as the mass tort matures and an
increasing number of future claimants become present claimants, one's initial
estimation can be tested and adjusted accordingly. 37 Speculations about the
third factor-the time distribution of future claims-are likely to start early
and to be incorrect.3 This uncertainty will probably remain relatively high
well into the mass tort maturation, but it is itself problematic only for the
purpose of time discounting future claims. This is only a minor problem
compared to the difficulty of evaluating the number of future claimants-the
second factor. Consider asbestos litigation. By some estimates, more than
eleven million Americans have been harmed or potentially harmed by
asbestos.39 Others opine that this number is between twenty and thirty
million.40 Predictions of the number of asbestos-related deaths vary from
200,000 to 500,000.1 If there is a globally mature mass tort, asbestos is the
one.42 Yet the number of future asbestos-related claimants is still uncertain.
This uncertainty is an unavoidable problem that any global settlement regime
must address. My proposal includes suggestions for ameliorating this
problem.43
Compliance with the four global maturity requirements is necessary for the
success of any global settlement. These requirements insure that there is
enough information for evaluating future claims. The importance of this
information becomes clear once one considers the reasons for concern about
37. Compare, for example, the great similarity of futures' "subclassng' (distmbution between different
types of claimants) in the latest global settlement, see, e.g.. Coffee, supra note 3. at 1395 (describing the
1994 Georgine payment schedule), with the futures' payment schedule established eight years carlier. see
id. at 1396 (describing the Johns-Manville settlement), and with the 1989 grid for present plaintiffs'
compensation, see In re Fibreboard Corp., 893 F.2d 706. 710 (5th Cir. 1990). Thus. when a mass tort is
globally mature, the internal small-large ratio among the futures is usually well known.
38. The Fifth Circuit opined in 1986 that asbestos-related claims would continue to appear for the next
15 years. See Jenkins, 782 F.2d at 470. Five years later, estimates extended to the year 2015. See. e.g.
ASBESTOS REPORT, supra note 18, at 2. Shortly thereafter, an expert panel concluded that asbestos.related
claims would not cease until the year 2049. See In re Joint E. & S. Dist. Asbestos Liig.. 878 F. Supp. 473.
490 (E. & S.D.N.Y. 1995), aff'd in part, vacated in part. 78 F.3d 764 (2d Cir. 1996) The rate with which
future claims will turn into present ones is also likely to remain uncertain for some time before a mass tort
becomes globally mature. The Jenkins court, for example, predicted in 1986 that "'filings will continue at
a steady rate until the year 2000." Jenkins, 782 F.2d at 470. It was wrong. For example, the number of
asbestos-related filings increased by 66% between 1989 and 1990. See Note, In re Joint Eastern and
Southern District Asbestos Litigation: Bankrupt and Backlogged-A Proposal for the Use of Federal
Common Law in Mass Tort Class Actions, 58 BROOK. L. REv. 553. 555 n.9 (1992).
39. See ASBESTOS REPORT, supra note 18, at 6-7.
40. See Georgine v. Amchem Prods., Inc., 157 F.R.D. 246, 325 (E.D. Pa. 1994). acated. 83 F3d 610
(3d Cir. 1996), aff'd sub nom. Amchem Prods.. Inc. v. Windsor, 117 S. Ct. 2231 (1997).
41. Compare ASBESTOS REPORT, supra note 18, at 2 (200.000), with Coffee. supra note 3. at 1385
(500,000).
42. See, e.g., Ahearn v. Fibreboard Corp., 162 F.R.D. 505. 528 (E.D. Tex. 1995) (asserting that
"[a]sbestos litigation is undoubtedly the most 'mature' of all mass tort litigation"). aff'd sub nom. In re
Asbestos Litig. (Flanagan v. Ahearn), 90 F.3d 963 (5th Cir. 1996). vacated, 117 S. Ct. 2503 (1997); Coffee,
supra note 3, at 1433 (suggesting that asbestos cases "are the paradigm of a 'mature' mass tort").
43. See infra notes 77-89 and accompanying text.
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the futures' fate. The following equation is a simplified but helpful model for
analyzing the threats faced by the futures:
(1) F= WL xNL+ WsxNs+ (1 -cc) x WFxNF.
Here, F is a total settlement fund that defendants agree to pay. NL, Ns, and NF
are the numbers of present large claimants, present small claimants, and future
claimants, respectively." WL and Ws are the values of the adjusted expected
individual recoveries for large and small present claimants, respectively. 4 WF
is the adjusted expected value of a future claim.4" x is a discount coefficient
reflecting a reduction of the futures' claims due to their uncertainty.
The reason for concern about future claimants is apparent from the
equation. While the total fund amount F and the present claims' values and
numbers are relatively fixed, the overall value of future claims is subject to the
uncertainties embedded in a.47 The history of global settlements shows that
defendants and present plaintiffs have learned to exploit these uncertainties and
to transfer substantial wealth (namely, cc x WF x NF) from future claimants to
themselves by persuading courts to agree to ever-increasing values for aC. There
are at least three ways to discount future claims: Their value can be discounted
(value discount, av), their number can be reduced (number discount, aXN), 48
or some claims can be excluded from the agreement altogether (exclusion
discount, aE). Overall,
44. While NL and N. will be virtually certain (because their sum is the overall number of cases flied
against the mass tort defendants), the number of future claimants will not be certain until the last future
claimant becomes a present one, possibly decades after the settlement. For the purposes of Equation (1).
however, NF is a known number. The uncertainty about the expected number of future claims is impounded
in at.
45. The adjustments are for attorney's fees, the probability of loss at trial, the time delay in getting
to trial and in receiving an award upon winning a verdict, and intangible costs such as being denied a day
in court. In other words, WL and W. are the median values taken from the latest individual and nonglobal
settlements.
46. WF is arrived at in the following way. First, the negotiators (plaintiffs' attorneys, defense attorneys,
and, possibly, the court) agree on WL and Ws. Second, they determine the percentage, 8, of, for example,
large claimants in the future claimants' total pool (the fourth factor in the global maturity test). Often,
8 = NL - (NL + Ns) x 100%. Finally, they calculate WF = 8 x W. + (I - 8) x W.. In reality, of course,
present (and future) claimants are separated into more than just two categories. As long as the distribution
between these categories is known (and it usually is, see supra note 37 and accompanying text), WVrcan
be easily calculated. Finally, WF is discounted to present value, possibly at a standard long-term interest
rate on government securities of duration matching the expected duration of the mass tort. Present-value
discount is not a part of cc.
47. In other words, the uncertainties in the fund amount F and the present claims' values and numbers
are much less than the uncertainty of the overall value of future claims due to a greater uncertainty in a.
48. The parties could mistakenly agree on a number that turns out to be too high. This is highly
unlikely, however, because both the defendants and the present claimants would be better off understating
the number of future claimants. Such an agreement would also go against the vast mass tort experience of
underestimating the number of future claims. See, e.g., In re Joint E. & S. Dist. Asbestos Litig. (Findley
v. Blinken), 982 F.2d 721, 726 (2d Cir. 1992) (describing the unraveling of the Johns-Manville Trust when,
within several months of its formation, it received 50% more claims than the highest estimate made when
the plan was approved).
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(2) (1 - a) = (I - av) x (I -aN) x (I - a).
The Georgine settlement is a vivid example of how substantial these discounts
can be. In it, the district court approved a settlement in which the futures were
to receive a whopping 30% to 40% less than present claimants with identical
injuries.49 This was equivalent to setting oxv = 0.3 - 0.4. The exclusion
discount was also substantial. In addition to the exclusion of the loss-of-
consortium claims emphasized by the Supreme Court,5" future claimants
received no compensation for "exposure only" claims such as increased risk
of cancer, fear of future asbestos-related injury, and medical r.ionitoring.3
Those having asbestos-related pleural thickening on their lungs, but not
physical impairment, went uncompensated as well.52 All of these types of
claimants received some compensation in the invehitory settlements binding
present plaintiffs. According to those who objected to the Georgine settlement,
approximately ha/f of the claims that the Georgine defendants paid in the tort
system would not have qualified for payment under the exposure and medical
criteria set forth in the settlement proposal." In other words, the Georgine
proponents persuaded the court to accept a global settlement in which (aE = 0.5.
Even without considering aN,- therefore, one can conclude that future
claimants in Georgine were destined to receive a meager thirty-five percent of
the known values of their claims.55 Sixty-five percent of their awards was
split between the present claimants and the defendants-meaning that future
claimants lost two-thirds of their potential recovery based on almost nothing
but the fact that they held future rather than present claims.6 The picture in
the Ahearn settlement was not much prettier." Both settlements were
approved by the district courts; one was affirmed on appeal. It is not
49. See Susan P. Koniak, Feasting While the Widow Weeps: Gcorgine v. Amchem Products. Inc., 80
CORNELL L. REv. 1045, 1066-68 (1995). Note that the same plaintiffs' attorneys settled their present claims
with the same defendants shortly prior to the global settlement in separate inventory settlements providing
a convenient reference point for the established historic values. The parties also had the awards schedules
from the Johns-Manville bankruptcy, also involving asbestos, as a reference. Nevertheless, the Georgine
awards were on average about one-seventh of those in the Johns-Manvillc case, despite the fact that the
Georgine defendants were financially viable companies while Johns-Manville was in bankruptcy. See
Coffee, supra note 3, at 1395-96.
50. See Amchem Prods., Inc. v. Windsor, 117 S. Ct. 2231. 2251 (1997).
51. See id. at 2240.
52. See id.
53. See Coffee, supra note 3, at 1394.
54. For a detailed discussion of a. estimation, see infra notes 77-89 and accompanying text.
55. This figure is calculated in the following way: (I - oi.) x (I - a.) = (1 - 0.3) x (I - 0.5) = 0.35.
56. I say "almost" because discounting to present value should have made futures' awards somewhat
smaller.
57. While the disparities in treatment of present and future claimants were not as glanng in Ahearn
as they were in Georgine, they were still very substantial. See Coffee, supra note 3. at 1401-02 (suggesting
that the soaring stock price of the Fibreboard Corp., the defendant in Ahearn. was strong evidence that
future claimants lost substantial wealth as the result of the settlement).
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surprising, then, that the Supreme Court might have felt that a system allowing
these kinds of inequities needed to be fixed.
III. THE PROPOSED GLOBAL CLASS ACTION
In this Note, I suggest a solution that prevents the "robbing" of future
claimants that took place in Georgine and Ahearn. This solution is also more
fair and more acceptable to defendants. Moreover, it may fulfill the Supreme
Court's requirements and satisfy the Court's concerns as expressed in Amchem.
I call this solution a global limited fund mandatory settlement class action with
a modified pro rata distribution of benefits for present and future claimants.
The pro rata rule is at the heart of my proposal.
A. The Pro Rata Rule
The pro rata rule means that equally injured plaintiffs receive equal awards
regardless of whether they are present, near, or far future claimants. 58 Courts,
scholars, and practitioners have acknowledged that this rule is intrinsically fair.
Indeed, this is a logical default; any deviation from it must be explained. For
example, one of the two pillars on which the Second Circuit rested its
affirmance of the first ever global settlement was that it provided for "the
even-handed treatment of both identified and unidentified legitimate
claimants. ' 59 Likewise, Professor Roger Cramton contends that "[a] sound
general principle is that individuals who have similar claims against the same
defendants should be treated similarly." 6 Professor Susan Koniak agrees. 6'
Professor John Coffee argues as well that a close nexus should be required
between the injuries sustained by at least some present plaintiffs and those to
be sustained by the worst-off future claimants.62 Even the attorney arguing
in favor of the Georgine settlement represented it as "treat[ing] similarly-
58. For example, assume that A has mesothelioma caused by the defendant firm X and A has filed a
law suit against X. B has mesothelioma caused by X, but has not filed a suit yet. C does not have
mesothelioma, but will develop it five years from now because of X as well. Assuming that the
consequences of their respective mesotheliomas will be the same, A, B, and C are "equally injured" for the
purposes of the pro rata rule. (It is conceivable that future changes in medicine and science will render our
assumptions false. I address such changes later. See infra notes 167-170 and accompanying text.) Under
the pro rata rule, A, B, and C would receive equal awards (with B's and C's awards discounted to present
value and adjusted downward to reflect the part of A's award that would go to A's attorney.) Of course,
B and C are unknown today. If a tort is globally mature, however, the approximate number of Bs and Cs
and the expected date of their "appearance" will be known. See supra notes 36-43 and accompanying text.
This knowledge would suffice to establish the pro rata distribution. Under this rule, av and as are always
zero.
59. In re "Agent Orange" Prod. Liab. Litig., 996 F.2d 1425, 1437 (2d Cir. 1993) (emphasis added).
60. Roger C. Cramton, Individualized Justice, Mass Torts, and "Settlement Class Actions": An
Introduction, 80 CORNELL L. REv. 811, 831 (1995).
61. See Koniak, supra note 49, at 1075-78.
62. See Coffee, supra note 3, at 1435.
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situated claimants similarly. ' 63 Yet, despite this seeming consensus, courts
and scholars stop short of stating unequivocally that pro rata distribution must
be the rule of mass tort global settlements. This Note makes such a statement.
The pro rata rule satisfies the Court's adequacy requirement that "either
... the terms of the settlement or ... the structure of the negotiations...
[must assure the court] that the named plaintiffs operated under a proper
understanding of their representational responsibilities."6' The Georgine
settlement failed to satisfy this demand for two reasons. First, the named
Georgine plaintiffs purported to represent the entire class rather than discrete
subclasses. 65 Second, there were significant conflicts between named plaintiffs
who were near futures and unnamed plaintiffs who were intermediate and far
futures. 66 Although the pro rata rule would not completely resolve the first
problem, it would alleviate it significantly by collapsing numerous subclasses
into just a few. With no need to account for differences between near,
intermediate, and far futures, the only relevant subclasses are for large and
small plaintiffs. To be sure, even this type of subclassing is not as easy as it
sounds; but it is possible.67 The pro rata rule goes a great distance in reducing
the second problem raised by the Court as well. Because the values of identical
claims of a present and a future plaintiff are the same," present plaintiffs
negotiating for higher values for their claims necessarily maximize awards for
the futures.69 Thus, the pro rata regime not only makes it harder for present
claimants to obtain a larger share of the pie, F, but it also encourages them to
enlarge the pie itself-thus benefiting the futures. The greater alignment of
interests between the present and the future claimants mitigates the insoluble
problem of finding a representative for claimants who do not yet exist.
63. Koniak, supra note 49, at 1149 n.475 (quoting an attorney representing the Centcr for Claims
Resolution). While one might attribute this statement to an extreme case of tral advocacy. it shows that
even the Georgine advocates recognized equal treatment as a normative goal.
64. Amchem Prods., Inc. v. Windsor. 117 S. Ct. 2231, 2251 (1997) (citing FED. R. Civ. P. 23(aj(4)).
65. See id. Other courts had already demanded subclassing in asbestos settlements. See. e.g.. In re Joint
E. & S. Dist. Asbestos Litig. (Findley v. Blinken), 982 F.2d 721. 739 (2d Cir. 1992).
66. See Amchem, 117 S. Ct. at 2251. Just as present claimants can "rob" future ones, near futures can
"rob" far futures by providing for front-loaded payments, not accounting for inflation. etc. The Court's
concern was clearly not about a particular conflict (present plaintiffs versus futures or near futures versus
far futures), but about a fundamental conflict of interests among claimants whose claims appear at different
points in time.
67. For examples of subclassing along the size scale (and ignonng the temporal scale), see RICIIARD
B. SOBOL, BENDING THE LAW: THE STORY OF THE DALKON SHIELD BANKRUPTCY 312-14 (1991); and
Coffee, supra note 3, at 1394-95. These examples show that real settlements have many more than the
small and large categories used for the analysis in this Note. They also show that this larger number of
categories is manageable. But these categories are manageable only as long as all of them apply only to
present plaintiffs. It is hard to imagine how the settling parties could separate present. near, intermediate.
and far futures into each of these categories and provide each category with separate representation.
68. That is, they are the same with time discounting for the future claim's value.
69. To be sure, present claimants still have opportunities to transfer wealth from the futures by. for
example, persuading the court to accept a high a, or not to account for inflation. But their overall
opportunities are significantly curtailed. As the analysis of the Georgine settlement showed, see supra notes
49-56 and accompanying text, present plaintiffs in that case discounted future claims by 65% just by
establishing a high txv and ac---something they would not have been able to do under the pro rata rule.
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Because the alignment of present and future interests is not complete even
under the pro rata rule, future claimants still need separate representation. 0
But by making subclassing and separate representation manageable, and by
better aligning the interests of present and future claimants, the pro rata rule
responds to the two concerns underlying the Court's finding of inadequate
representation in Georgine and Ahearn.
Another benefit of the pro rata rule is the increased certainty of the future
claims' values. According to Professor Peter Schuck, uncertainty has been the
core problem of mass tort litigation.7' It has decreased as individual mass
torts have matured and as the entire system has undergone an evolutionary
development not unlike the maturation of a particular mass tort.72 Relentless
efforts by litigants, lawyers, insurers, and judges went into achieving greater
predictability. Yet, as applied to future claimants, certainty seems to have
become an undesirable side-effect. The discussion of Equation (1)
demonstrated that greater uncertainty surrounding future claims creates an
opportunity to transfer a larger portion of the fund F to present plaintiffs and
defendants. While these parties perceive certainty as being against their self-
interest, there may be compelling reasons for them to reconsider.
Uncertainty greatly increases opportunistic behavior. Because, under the
current regime, the amount eventually transferred from futures to present
claimants and defendants (cx x WF x NF) is highly uncertain, present plaintiffs
cannot reliably estimate the relation between the defendants' assets and the
total value of the plaintiffs' claims. Instead of settling earlier and preserving
a higher overall recovery, present plaintiffs would gamble and hold out for
individual litigation, hoping that if they do not get to trial before the settlement
is finally reached, they will increase a even further. A similar analysis applies
to the defendants. Even if they have a good estimate of the future claims'
value, WF, the indeterminacy of oa prevents them from reliably evaluating their
own position and adopting an appropriate negotiating strategy. Therefore, the
indeterminacy of c both postpones the settlement past the optimal time and
complicates the negotiations by introducing a critical variable on which the
parties need to agree. Moreover, even after they have agreed on the value of
c, they need to decide how to split ax x WF x N--another factor that might
cause the talks to go sour. Finally, an unacceptably high cc may lead to
decertification on appeal.73
70. Present claimants' and future claimants' interests diverge due to the indeterminacy in the number
of future claims and uncertainties external to a particular mass tort. For a discussion of the latter type of
uncertainties, see infra notes 165-177 and accompanying text.
71. See Schuck, supra note 9, at 948-50.
72. See id.
73. This Note argues that this is exactly what happened in Amchem. Saying that the Court disapproved
of the settlement because of its concern for future claimants is almost the same as saying that the Court
found a to be unacceptably high.
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The pro rata rule reduces opportunistic behavior by making ca more
certain. The rule eliminates two of the three components embedded in a. First,
the pro rata rule sets future awards (in present discounted value) equal to the
recoveries of identically injured present claimants. Under the pro rata regime,
therefore, a, = 0. Second, the pro rata rule resolves the exclusion problems
reflected in aE. The Georgine settlement contained many details about what
types of future plaintiffs would be eligible for recovery from the fund and on
what conditions.74 The settlement contained case flow limitations, processing
rules, and other payment terms that would have enabled present claimants to
seize a disproportionate share of the total fund. 75 The pro rata rule resolves
all these issues in a consistent and predictable fashion. Whatever the rules are
for the present claimants, the rules for future claimants will be the same.
Whatever types of present claims are included in the settlement, the identical
types of future claims will be included as well? 6 Under the pro rata rule,
then, aE = 0. Because the only partial discount coefficient that is not set to
zero by the pro rata rule is a 1, a under that rule is equivalent to a,1.
Indeterminacy about the number of future claimants may be significant
even when a mass tort is globally mature.77 This, however, does not negate
the benefits of the pro rata rule. First, as I have just explained, the rule brings
more certainty and fewer opportunities to discount future claims. Second, ao1
for a globally mature mass tort may be more certain than it appears at first
glance. While the range of available estimates is often staggering," there are
usually several middle-of-the-road estimates that are not too far from one
74. See Georgine v. Amchem Prods., Inc., 83 F.3d 610, 620 (3d Cir. 1996), aff'd sub non. Amchem
Prods., Inc. v. Windsor, 117 S. Ct. 2231 (1997).
75. See Coffee, supra note 3, at 1446.
76. This also helps to resolve another perpetual problem plaguing mass tons--so-called -junk" claims
These are insubstantial claims attracted en masse by the settlement itself. According to one plaintiffls
lawyer, 90% of all claims are "junk." See Schuck. supra note 9. at 961 n.97 (quoting Paul D. Rheingold.
Esq.). Inclusion of junk claims increases Ns and N. (for a part of the futures' total pool consists of small
claimants). It leads inescapably to a reduction in individual recovenes by non-junk claimants. Without the
pro rata regime, the claimants' interests are as follows: Large claimants prefer the narrowest possible
definition of compensable claims, ideally (but unrealistically) limited to the present large claims only. Small
claimants prefer the widest possible definition of compensable injunes for themselves, but the narrowest
possible range for the futures. The interests of all present claimants converge in seeking to exclude most
of the future claims-regardless of their merits. Under the pro rata regime, these interests realign. Because
the definition of a "junk" claim is the same for the futures as it is the for present small claimants (i.e..
o E = 0), the latter, by protecting their own interests, necessarily protect future small claimants as well.
Thus, from a situation where the interests of the present plaintiffs conflict with those of the future ones,
the pro rata rule creates a regime where the interests of the present (and future) large plaintiffs conflict with
the interests of present (and future) small claimants. All futures have representatives among present
plaintiffs negotiating a global settlement.
77. See supra text accompanying notes 39-43. The Dalkon Shield litigation is another example. Even
when this mass tort was mature, the discount coefficient for future claimants was hotly disputed. See
SOBOL, supra note 67, at 183.
78. In the Dalkon Shield litigation, for example, the lowest estimate of future defcndant's liability was
S1.215 billion, and the highest was $7.167 billion. See SOBOL. supra note 67. at 183. The more recent
estimates of the total number of asbestos-related claims against Manville Trust range from 210.000 to
600,000. See Coffee, supra note 3, at 1361 nn.58-59.
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another.79 Moreover, considering that the most biased parties usually produce
the outliers, 0 it seems reasonable to trust the middle figures more. Finally,
while o.-type indeterminacies are likely to be present in all mature mass torts,
their magnitude will surely differ.8' There is no reason to expect that
persistent lack of success in valuing asbestos-related claims will be the rule for
every future mass tort.82
Another reason that cxN-type uncertainty does not negate the benefits of the
pro rata rule is that courts-the final arbiters of aff--have gained substantial
expertise in evaluating expected numbers of future claimants. Special masters,
independent experts, expert panels, specifically commissioned independent
scientific studies, and court-mandated valuations by the parties themselves have
all been used by courts to clarify the uncertainties surrounding future
claimants.8 ' The courts are adopting increasingly sophisticated statistical
techniques, such as random and representative samples, common-issue
extrapolation, statistical analysis (including regression modeling), and even
expert systems.8" To be sure, courts' experience with assessing future claims
79. Two or three out of the five figures suggested during evaluation of A.H. Robins's liability in the
Dalkon Shield litigation were close to each other. See SOBOL, supra note 67, at 183. A similar middle
ground may be found if one looks at all estimates suggested for Manville Trust asbestos liability: 210,000;
306,000; 450,000; 560,000; and from 300,000 to 600,000. See Coffee, supra note 3, at 1361 nn. 58-59.
While these numbers are quite different, one can detect a range suggesting at least the order of magnitude
for the expected number of future claims.
80. During the Dalkon Shield litigation, for example, the company itself presented the $1,215 billion
estimate while the tort claimants provided the $7.167 billion estimate. The equity committee, the unsecured
creditors committee, and the defendant's insurance company produced the middle-ground valuations. See
SOBOL, supra note 67, at 183.
81. Arguably, less complicated valuation problems in the Dalkon Shield case led to more accurate
predictions and to more adequate compensation of future claimants. See, e.g., Georgene M. Vairo, The
Dalkon Shield Claimants Trust: Paradigm Lost (or Found)?, 61 FORDHAM L. REv. 617, 651-60 (1992)
(describing the A.H. Robins bankruptcy as a success). In other mass torts, such as asbestos, estimating the
futures' expected numbers and total liabilities has been much harder. In the asbestos context, the courts,
and the experts working under their supervision, have struggled to produce accurate valuations. Both the
Johns-Manville and the National Gypsum bankruptcies resulted in underfunded trusts. See Coffee, supra
note 3, at 1387, 1422 n.308.
82. Note that where am-type uncertainties are relatively small, elimination of other contingencies by
the pro rata rule is even more valuable because present plaintiffs would have added incentives to increase
ca, and oxE (because they are less able to manipulate am).
83. Several courts have shown a robust capacity to address am-type indeterminacies. In the Manville
case, for example, Judge Weinstein used a special master (a mass tort expert), a court expert (a law school
dean), another expert (a professor of demographics), and a consultant to establish the number of future
claimants. See In re Joint E. & S. Dist. Asbestos Litig. (Findley v. Blinken), 982 F.2d 721, 731-32 (2d Cir.
1992). The judge appropriated $60,000 for studies of the expected numbers of future claimants. See id. at
732. In the Dalkon Shield case, Judge Merhige required each party to make its own evaluation of the
expected number of future claims and their total value. See SOBOL, supra note 67, at 178-97. As a result,
five different teams of experts used various statistical techniques to produce five different estimates of the
future claims' number. Far from simply accepting the numbers, the judge interrogated the proponents of
each valuation at a special hearing and invited all parties to contest one another's findings. See id. Yet
another example of an extensive effort to evaluate the expected number and total value of future claims
is the National Gypsum bankruptcy. See FREDERICK C. DUNBAR & DENISE A. NEUMANN, NATIONAL ECON.
RESEARCH ASSOC., INC., ESTIMATING FUTURE ASBESTOS CLAIMS: LESSONS FROM THE NATIONAL GYPSUM
LITIGATION (1993).
84. See Francis E. McGovem, Looking to the Future of Mass Torts: A Comment on Schuck and
Siliciano, 80 CORNELL L. REv. 1022, 1027-32 (1995).
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is not yet as expansive as their use of statistical techniques in estimating
claims' values and causation. 85 But such experience clearly exists. A very
similar problem of statistical valuation of contingent bankruptcy claims has
been the subject of great interest for some time.6 Numerous models have
been proposed, and new ones continue to appear.8' All this information would
be at the disposal of courts considering global settlements under the proposed
regime. Moreover, as more mass torts globally mature and as courts focus
more on the expected number of future claims, they will undoubtedly use their
familiarity with statistical analysis and the methods developed for bankruptcy
proceedings in a new context. As more estimates of the future claims' number
are made and revised, the statistical techniques will be adjusted for past
mistakes and become increasingly reliable.
Yet another reason not to dismiss the proposed rule because of cx,{-
indeterminacies is the parties' own self-interest. Global settlement negotiators
are sophisticated repeat players with a wealth of institutional knowledge.as
They have just witnessed the failure of the two most innovative global mass
tort settlements, caused in large part by an unacceptably high ax. To the extent
a more uncertain a is synonymous with a higher oa, present plaintiffs and
defendants benefit from the uncertainty. But this uncertainty is also very costly.
It leads to lost efforts and time spent in negotiating for a mutually acceptable
oa. Perhaps even more importantly, too high an ax may cause decertification on
appeal. Having considered the costs as well as the benefits, even defendants
and present plaintiffs may conclude that a predictable c, even if closer to zero,
is better not only for the futures, but for themselves as well.89
85. See Robert G. Bone, Statistical Adjudication: Rights. Justice. and Utility In a iorld of Process
Scarcity, 46 VAND. L. REv. 561 (1993); Troyen A. Brennan. Causal Chains and Statistical Links: The Role
of Scientific Uncertainty in Hazardous-Substance Litigation. 73 CORNELL L REV. 469 (1988); Michael J.
Saks & Peter David Blanck, Justice Improved The Unrecognized Benefits of Aggregation and Sampling
in the Trial of Mass Torts, 44 STAN. L. REV. 815 (1992); Steve Gold. Note. Causation in Toxic Torts:
Burdens of Proof Standards of Persuasion, and Statistical Evidence. 96 YALE L.J. 376 (1986). The
differences among courts' experiences can be easily explained. Estimation of the claims' values is the
critical issue in traditional (nonglobal) mass torts class actions---something the courts have been dealing
with for some time. See, e.g., Jenkins v. Raymark Indus., 782 F.2d 468. 471 (5th Cir. 1986) (affirming a
scheme of determining class members' claim values based on jury "'mini-trials" and conclusions of a special
master). Until recently, courts simply had less need to use statistics to predict the expected number of future
claimants. The Dalkon Shield settlement was not approved until the late 1980s. See In r A.H. Robins Co..
880 F.2d 709 (4th Cir. 1989). The National Gypsum and the Johns-Manville bankruptcies reached their
initial conclusions in the early 1990s. See Coffee. supra note 3. at 1422 n.308.
86. See David S. Salsburg & Jack F. Williams. A Statistical Approach to Claims Estimation in
Bankruptcy, 32 WAKE FOREST L. REV. 1119 (1997) (critiqutng existing statistical techniques and suggesting
a new one).
87. See, e.g., id. at 1130-38 (describing an existing face-value model, a zero-value model, a market-
theory model, a forced-settlement model, a discounted-value model, and a summary-tnal model. and
proposing a new model).
88. See Schuck, supra note 9, at 951-53.
89. To bolster the incentives against skewing atN estimates, I later propose additional procedural
protections for future claimants. See infra notes 160-164 and accompanying text.
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Uncertainties surrounding future claims are great indeed. Yet these
uncertainties should not paralyze policymakers. The choice is not between
making a hasty judgment now or a wise one later. The choice is between
making a reasonable decision under the circumstances now or leaving future
victims with no compensation (as in the case of a defendant's future
bankruptcy) or virtually no compensation (as in the Georgine and Ahearn
settlements) later. Several of the factors outlined above combine with the pro
rata rule to reduce the inevitable uncertainty to a reasonable level.
My final argument in support of the pro rata rule is that it is the law of
bankruptcy,90 where it applies equally to future and present claimants. Prior
to the Amchem decision, two vastly different legal regimes existed side by
side. If a mass tort defendant ended in bankruptcy, its assets were distributed
pro rata.9' If bankruptcy was averted by a global settlement, future claims
were treated separately, discounted, and subjected to the mercy of whatever the
attorneys and courts thought was "fair."g This disparity is indefensible. While
an ordinary class action is very different from bankruptcy, the "smell" of
bankruptcy is in the air whenever the parties contemplate a global mass tort
settlement. 93 This does not mean that the proposed regime should mimic
every feature of bankruptcy law. In fact, the bankruptcy regime itself has failed
in several important respects when dealing with mass torts. 94 Yet bankruptcy
and the proposed global settlement regime are similarly motivated: Resources
available to satisfy claims are insufficient and must be apportioned according
to some principle. In these circumstances, there is no justification for deviating
from the distributive rule chosen by Congress.
Pro rata distribution is widely acknowledged as being intrinsically fair. It
responds to the reasons underlying the Supreme Court's holding that the
Georgine and Ahearn plaintiffs did not adequately represent their respective
classes. It increases certainty and brings some benefits to the present plaintiffs
and defendants while giving unmatched protection to the future claimants.
Although it does not guarantee the futures absolute equality with the present
90. In bankruptcy, the pro rata rule is called temporal equality. See Mark J. Roe, Bankruptcy and Mass
Tort, 84 COLUM. L. REv. 846, 853 (1984).
91. See, e.g., In re Klein Sleep Prods., Inc., 78 F.3d 18, 20 (2d Cir. 1996); In re Joint E. & S. Dist.
Asbestos Litig. (Findley v. Blinken), 982 F.2d 721, 736-37 (2d Cir. 1992); Coffee, supra note 3, at 1458-
59.
92. The courts have gone so far as to adopt a rule that if a settlement is fair, then the negotiations
were fair as well. See, e.g., Bowling v. Pfizer, 143 F.R.D. 141, 152 (S.D. Ohio 1992) (citing cases). The
Amchem Court chastised the district court for overreliance on "fairness" of the settlement by explicitly
stating that "[f]ederal courts ... lack authority to substitute for Rule 23's certification criteria a standard
never adopted-that if a settlement is 'fair,' then certification is proper." Amchem Prods., Inc. v. Windsor,
117 S. Ct. 2231, 2249 (1997).
93. In Ahearn, for example, the court used a mandatory class action because available assets comprised
a limited fund of insurance proceeds. If a $2 billion insurance fund was almost insufficient to satisfy all
existing and future claims, an extra tenth of this amount ($250 million, representing all of the defendant's
assets) could not have been enough to guarantee a comfortable distance from Chapter 11. But see infra note
104 and accompanying text (arguing that a company's assets may not reflect its true market value).
94. See infra Part IV.
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claimants, the rule substantially reduces the freedom to "rob" the futures that
present plaintiffs possess today. The rule is also consistent with the law of
bankruptcy, which is extremely relevant in the global settlement context. These
are powerful reasons to take a decisive step and to recognize that pro rata
should be the only distributive rule for global mass tort settlements.
B. A Limited Fund Class Action
A limited fund mandatory class action under Rule 23(b)(1) could be the
only remaining avenue for global settlements via Rule 23 in view of the
Court's broad rejection of the Georgine class on predominance grounds. The
Court explained that Rule 23(b)(3) cannot be satisfied because of the numerous
differences between the members of the class.95 This led the Court to
conclude that "any overarching dispute about the health consequences of
asbestos exposure cannot satisfy the Rule 23(b)(3) predominance standard."96
But these differences are by no means idiosyncratic to asbestos litigation.
Breast implants, Agent Orange, tobacco, and just about any other mass tort
share most of the disparities present in the Georgine class. It is thus hard to
see how any overarching dispute about the health consequences of any of these
mass torts can satisfy the Rule 23(b)(3) predominance standard under Amchem.
If common questions of law or fact can never predominate in a mass tort
setting, the only available alternative is a 23(b)(1) mandatory class action,
which does not need to satisfy the predominance requirement.9' Necessity,
however, is not the only reason to favor the limited fund class action.
One of the oft-expressed concerns about the class action is that the
collective processing of claims, especially future claims, violates an important
maxim of litigant autonomy.9 There is a credible argument that the conflict
between the traditional paradigm of individual justice and a modern
compensation-driven conception of collective justice is the dominant tension
in achieving a satisfactory resolution of mass tort cases.99 A global settlement
95. The Georgine plaintiffs were exposed to different products, for different durations. and in different
ways, suffered different illnesses, and had different complicating factors. See Amchem. 117 S. Ct. at 2250.
In addition, it remains unclear whether any exposure-only plaintiffs will contract a disease at all, and if so.
which ones will do so and what their medical expenses will be. See id.
96. Id.
97. Note that 23(b)(1) class actions are still subject to the four-prong test of Rule 23(a). including the
commonality requirement. Importantly, the Court acknowledged that the commonality requirement, while
similar to the predominance inquiry, is far less demanding. See id.
98. This was one of the main reasons that courts were slow to accept mass tot class actions in the
first place. See Coffee, supra note 3, at 1344 & n.2. It was also one of the greatest complaints of the
injured veterans in the Agent Orange case-the first case to approve a global settlement. See PETER H,
SCHUCK, AGENT ORANGE ON TRIAL: MASS Toxic DISASTERS IN "THE COURTs 171-73 (1986). There is a
"deep-rooted historic tradition that everyone should have his own day in court." 18 CHiARLES A. WRIGHT
Er AL., FEDERAL PRACTICE AND PROCEDURE § 4449. at 417 (1981).
99. See Robert L. Rabin, Continuing Tensions in the Resolution of Aass Toxic Harm Cases. A
Comment, 80 CORNELL L. REv. 1037, 1041 (1995).
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is the ultimate de-individualization; t  it is thus desirable to postpone it until
the last appropriate moment.' 0' This moment arrives when abandoning the
traditional means of recovery for some is the only way to preserve some
recovery for all. Modifying Equation (1), one can describe this moment as a
situation when the following inequality holds true:
(3) V< WL x NL + Ws x Ns + (1 +y) x W x N.
Here, WL, Ws, WF, NL, and Ns have the same meaning as they did in Equation
(1). y is a premium coefficient representing the need to modify a strict pro rata
rule.102 NE is the expected number of future claimants: NE = (1 - cN) x
NF. t0 3 V is the value of the defendant firm in a special sense. First, it is the
value of the firm as a going concern, not merely the book value of its
assets.'04 Second, it includes all available insurance proceeds as well as
contributions from codefendants, if available. Finally, it is reduced, for
simplicity, by the present value of all liabilities unrelated to the mass tort.
Inequality (3) compares the present value of future cash flows available to
satisfy the firm's mass tort liability, V, with the present value of this liability.
The firm's mass tort liability has three components: the total value of existing
large claims (WL x N), the total value of existing small claims (Wsx Ns), and
the present value of all future claims modified by y ((I + y) x W. x NE-). If
Inequality (3) is true, the court should find that the defendants' assets are a
limited fund, and global settlement negotiations should follow.
100. This is true at least within a litigation-based regime. For alternative ways of resolving mass torts
through an administrative-law-type system, see, for example, Robert L. Rabin, Some Thoughts on the
Efficacy of a Mass Toxics Administrative Compensation Scheme, 52 MD. L. REV. 951 (1993); and David
Rosenberg, The Causal Connection in Mass Exposure Cases: A "Public Law" Vision of the Tort System,
97 HARv. L. REV. 849 (1984).
101. For discussion of the harms brought by immature global settlements, see infra notes 12 1-128 and
accompanying text.
102. For a detailed discussion of the factors affecting y, see infra notes 165-177 and accompanying
text.
103. Because under the pro rata regime a = oc, it is possible to simplify Equation (i) by substituting
a. for c. It makes sense to supplement (1 - a.) x NF with NF because this is the number the parties in fact
negotiate. It also eliminates the unrealistic assumption of Equation (1) that NF is known.
104. These two figures can be dramatically different. For example, Judge Williams concluded in 1981
that the assets of A.H. Robins totaled $280 million. See In re Northern Dist. of Cal. Dalkon Shield IUD
Prod. Liab. Litig., 526 F. Supp. 887, 893 (N.D. Cal. 1981), vacated, 693 F.2d 847 (9th Cir. 1982). Six
years later, bankruptcy proceedings led to the sale of the same company and the creation of a fund totaling
$2.475 billion. See In re A.H. Robins Co., 880 F.2d 709, 721 (4th Cir. 1989). The difference was due to
the fact that the district court looked at the defendant's net assets while the bankruptcy sale produced the
amount equal to the defendant's value as a going concern. Microsoft Corp. offers another example of a
possible difference between these two figures. Its net assets (total assets minus total liabilities) for 1997
were roughly $11 billion. See Microsoft Corp., 1997 Annual Report (visited Feb. 3, 1997) <http://www
.micmrosoft.conVmlmsftar97/financia/income.htm> <http:Ilwww.microsoft.conmmsftlar97/financial/highlights
.htm>, <http:llwww.microsoft.comlmsftlar97/financiallnotes.htm>. Its market value (roughly estimated as
the weighted average number of shares outstanding during 1997 times the arithmetic average of the lowest
and the highest share price for 1997) equals $125 billion. See id.
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This definition of a limited fund is different from the traditional
understanding of a "limited fund" class action under Rule 23(b)(1). 105 Courts
have interpreted the Rule and the Advisory Committee notes on the Rule by
distinguishing between two types of limited funds. The first type is a fund
limited as a matter of law, such as a fund comprising the total amount that a
defendant is required to pay in punitive damages resulting from the same
tort.' 6 The second type is a fund limited as a matter of fact. A "classic
instance" of such a fund is a "fixed sum of money,"'0 7 such as the total
insurance fund available to the defendant,' 8 or a fund established outside the
mass tort litigation.'09 Finally, the overwhelming majority of courts have
concluded that the assets of the defendant are not a "limited fund" within the
meaning of Rule 23(b)(1)(B). These courts have decertified limited fund class
actions where the limited fund consisted of the defendant firm's assets as "self-
evident evasion of the exclusive legal system established by Congress for
debtors to seek relief."" 0
The problems with my proposal to treat V as a limited fund are apparent
from the preceding discussion. V is not a "fixed sum of money." In fact, it is
not fixed at all. Many factors, both related and unrelated to the mass tort in
question, can affect V in the future."' Moreover, the limited fund concept
proposed in this Note resembles bankruptcy. Nevertheless, there are several
reasons that the "new" limited fund might withstand judicial scrutiny. First,
105. FED. R. Civ. P. 23(b)(1). The Advisory Committee has interpreted this rule as satisfied "when
claims are made by numerous persons against a fund insufficient to satisfy all clains Id 23(b)(IX(B)
advisory committee's note (1966).
106. See In re Joint E. & S. Dist. Asbestos Litig. (Findley v. Blinken). 982 F.2d 721. 736-37 (2d Cir
1992). See generally Richard L. Marcus, TheY Can't Do Thar. Can They 7 Tort Reform via Rule 23. 80
CORNELL L. REv. 858, 878 (1995) (noting that there are "'situations in which there is a finite legal limit
to the fund available to satisfy claims," such as when a dollar limit on recovery is placed by a law such
as the Price-Anderson Act).
107. Findley, 982 F.2d at 735.
108. See, e.g., In re Asbestos Litig. (Flanagan v. Ahearn). 90 F.3d 963. 982 (5th Cir 1996). vacated.
117 S. Ct. 2503 (1997).
109. See, e.g., Findley, 982 F.2d at 737 (referring to Drexel Burnham Lambert Group's settlement of
its litigation with the Securities and Exchange Commission providing for payment of $200 million into a
fund created for "defrauded purchasers, with the fund to be augmented by an additional payment of S150
million").
110. In re Joint E. & S. Dist. Asbestos Litig. (Keene Corp, v. Fiorelli). 14 F3d 726. 732 (2d Cir-
1993); accord In re School Asbestos Litig., 789 F.2d 996 (3d Cir. 1986); In re Bendeetin Prods. Lab
Litig., 749 F.2d 300 (6th Cir. 1984); In re Northern Dist. of Cal. Dalkon Shield IUD Prods. biab Linig..
693 F.2d 847, 851 (9th Cir. 1982). But see Ahearn. 90 F.3d at 983 (concluding that in appropnate and
limited circumstances the defendant's potential or probable insolvency can create a limited fund within the
meaning of Rule 23(b)(l)(B)); Findley, 982 F.2d at 739 (stating in dicta that a limited fund class action
may be possible in the case, but decertifying the class anyway); In re Drexel Burnham Lambert Group. Inc..
960 F.2d 285, 292 (2d Cir. 1992) (approving a limited fund class action under particular circumstances
while recognizing that normally it should not be used in the bankruptcy context).
11. For discussion of mass-tort-related factors, see mfra text accompanying note 152. Unrelated
factors affecting V may include making and patenting major inventions, securing the services of valuable
key personnel, reaching an advantageous agreement with labor unions, prevailing in lawsuits, and making
successful investments. The state of the national and global economy may also affect V.
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although V is not fixed, it is limited."t2 Second, the suggested regime does
not circumvent the law of bankruptcy, because it operates at a different stage
in the life of the defendant firm."13 Third, courts' reluctance to approve
limited fund settlements would be alleviated by the mandatory pro rata rule of
distribution." 4 Finally, the proposed limited fund global settlement produces
a net surplus by increasing the value of the defendant firm V."1
5
Keene Corp. v. Fiorellit 6 is an example of a case in which a court
rejected certification in part because it "mirror[ed] a bankruptcy
proceeding.""..7 The limited fund proposed in this Note, while similar to
bankruptcy in some sense, is dramatically different both from bankruptcy and
from the sort of class action at issue in Keene. At the time of the suit, Keene
Corp. was economically bankrupt; its liabilities exceeded its assets." 8 The
defendant attempted to circumvent legal bankruptcy by using a class action
mechanism, but the Second Circuit blocked the attempt. The limited fund
concept proposed in this Note differs from Keene's action in the following
way: Under Inequality (3), the mass tort is ready for a global settlement when
the value of the defendant firm as a going concern (i.e., its market value) is
less than its current liabilities plus the present value of its expected future
liabilities. This condition may obtain while the firm's current assets
substantially exceed its current liabilities and the firm is nowhere close to
bankruptcy, economically or legally. A second inequality necessary to insure
that this condition does obtain is:
(4) A > WL x NL + Ws x Ns.
Here, A is the book value of the defendant firm's assets available for tort
claimants." 9 The requirement expressed in Inequality (4) insures that a
112. A firm's value V is limited in the sense that it can be determined at any given moment from
certain available information. Those who believe in a semi-strong version of efficient market theory think
that the stock price of a firm reflects all publicly available information about it. See, e.g., STEPHEN A. Ross
Er AL., CoRPoRATE FINANCE 340 (4th ed. 1996). Conceivably, discovery during negotiations may yield
even more information, which could help produce an even better estimate of the firm's value. Amounts of
available insurance funds, contributions by codefendants, and non-tort liabilities can be estimated and are
never infinite.
113. See infra text accompanying notes 116-118.
114. See, e.g., Ahearn, 90 F.3d at 1006 (Smith, J., dissenting) (arguing that 23(b)(I)(B) class actions
are only constitutional for equitable (as opposed to legal) actions, such as actions by a trust beneficiary,
where the plaintiff's pro rata rights to the trust corpus are already established by law); Findley, 982 F.2d
at 736 (noting that it would be easier to approve a limited fund class action in the context of insolvency
when it is used "for its traditional purpose of effecting a pro rata reduction of all claims").
115. See infra text accompanying note 152.
116. In re Joint E. & S. Dist. Asbestos Litig. (Keene Corp. v. Fiorelli), 14 3d 726 (2d Cir. 1993).
117. Id. at 732; see also Findley, 982 F.2d at 735-36.
118. See Keene, 14 F.3d at 728 (reporting that Keene's net assets, including the disputed insurance
claims, were around $51 million while its asbestos-related liabilities were approximately $500 million).
119. A is thus the amount of the firm's net assets-its total assets reduced by the amount of its total
non-tort liabilities.
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defendant asking for a global settlement class action is not nearly bankrupt:
The book value of its assets available to satisfy existing tort claims exceeds the
value of these claims. Meanwhile, where Inequality (3) is satisfied, the market
value of the defendant firm is less than the firm's overall mass tort liability.
When both Inequality (3) and Inequality (4) are true, therefore, the defendant
is ready for a global settlement.'t2 The greater the expected number of future
claimants, Nff, the greater the likelihood that this situation will exist. A
combination of Inequalities (3) and (4) separates the proposed regime from
every limited fund mass tort settlement rejected by an appellate court until
now.
Inequality (4) insures that a global settlement does not come too late;
Inequality (3) guarantees that is does not come too early. Two types of
immature global settlements are the "preemptive" settlement and the
"nuisance"'' settlement. A defendant may initiate a preemptive settlement
for several reasons. It may be aware of some extremely harmful evidence
unknown to the plaintiffs. It may expect that recoveries will increase
substantially in the future. It may want to prevent plaintiff forum
shopping.' 22 Or it may simply seek good publicity. Whatever the reason, the
defendant in a preemptive settlement acts sooner rather than later to preempt
further maturation of a mass tort. If the defendant succeeds in reaching a
global settlement at this stage, plaintiffs are likely to be shortchanged.'2
Defendants face nuisance class actions much more often. Sometimes, a
nuisance settlement follows as it did in the Agent Orange case. In that case,
the plaintiffs at the time of the settlement had virtually no chance of success
on the merits: The defendants' product had no clear connection to the
plaintiffs' diseases, and the government, which purchased and used Agent
120. These conditions obtain every time the difference between the defendant firm's market and book
values (V - A) is less than the present value of the firm's future modified mass tort liability ((I + ") x
xN E).
121. I adopt the term "nuisance" settlement in view of Professor Schuck's conclusion that the only
possible explanation for the Agent Orange settlement amount was its "nuisance value" on the eve of the
trial. SCHUCK, supra note 98, at 259.
122. By acting preemptively, the defendant may choose plaintiffs' lawyers who agree to the legal
environment favorable to the defendant. The term legal environment includes factors ranging from the law
of a particular state to the views of a particular judge. For a demonstration of the cntical importance of the
legal environment, see SOBOL, supra note 67, at 40, which describes the troubles of A.H. Robins in the
courtroom of Judge Theis.
123. The breast implants settlement may be an example of a preemptive settlement. See In re Silicone
Gel Breast Implant Prod. Liab. Litig. (Breast Implants Litigation), No. CV 92-P-10000-S. MDL No. 926.
Civ. A. No. CV94-P-11558-S, 1994 WL 578353, at 01 (N.D. Ala. Sept. 1. 1994). As this example shows.
defendants planning a preemptive settlement may underestimate the number of claims, overestimate their
own liability, or both. Former FDA Commissioner David Kessler. whose decision on January 7. 1992 to
impose a temporary moratorium on the use of silicone breast implants transformed the breast implant
litigation into a mass tort, said recently: "We now have, for the first time. a reasonable assurance that
silicone-gel implants do not cause a large increase in disease in women." West's Legal News. Torts and
Personal Injury: Breast Implants Pathfinder, 1997 WL 12523. at °4 (Jan. 16. 1997).
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Orange, was unwilling to accept any responsibility. 24 Yet the defendant
companies were forced to pay $180 million for their legally nonexistent
misdeeds. As with defendants in other nuisance class actions, the Agent
Orange manufacturers were under insurmountable pressure to settle-even
though the probability of an adverse judgment was low-because of the risk
of facing an all-or-nothing verdict. It is not surprising, then, that some courts
have referred to nuisance class actions as "judicial blackmail."' t A legal
regime favorable to such actions is hardly socially desirable. In addition to
being unfair to defendants, it precludes later plaintiffs, possibly with better
arguments and evidence, from litigating and receiving higher and more
justifiable awards. 26
Thus, an early global settlement is often undesirable. A preemptive
settlement benefits defendants by letting them off the hook before the full
extent of their liability is known, and thus is unfair to plaintiffs. A nuisance
settlement benefits plaintiffs who exact substantial sums from defendants
whose liability cannot be proven, at least at the time. All premature global
settlements unnecessarily abridge litigants' autonomy. Moreover, they often
produce arbitrary results because they are not based on historic claim values
established by repeated adjudication and individual settlements.127 Maturation
of claim values is, thus, a necessary prerequisite for any global settlement.128
The limited fund requirement, including the necessity to prove that Inequality
(3) is true, insures such maturation.
Finally, the new limited fund proposal may be extremely helpful to courts.
As one federal judge has pointed out, "[S]urprising as it may seem ... Rule
23 contains no standards at all governing judicial approval of class action
settlements.' ' 29 A more specific inquiry resulted in an identical conclusion:
"Rule 23(b)(1)(B) simply does not prescribe any standards for resolving
124. The Agent Orange fact pattern proved typical of nuisance mass tort class actions. In the Rhone-
Poulenc controversy, for example, plaintiffs' statistical chances of success were a meager 7.7%. See In re
Rhone-Poulenc Rorer, Inc., 51 F.3d 1293, 1299 (7th Cir. 1995). In the 15-year history of the breast
implants litigation, only about a dozen cases were adjudicated prior to consolidation in Judge Pointer's
court. See Breast Implants Litigation, 1994 WL 578353, at * 1. Smokers had no cases to rely on in Castano
v. American Tobacco Co., 84 F.3d 734 (5th Cir. 1996). The long history of tobacco litigation was of no
help to the Castano plaintiffs because they were relying both on a new theory of liability and on entirely
new evidence. See id. at 751.
125. Castano, 84 F.3d at 746 (citing cases).
126. Such plaintiffs appeared in the Agent Orange case and attempted to reopen the settlement. See
In re "Agent Orange" Prod. Liab. Litig., 996 E2d 1425 (2d Cir. 1993). The court barred their actions in
view of the earlier settlement.
127. To be sure, historic values themselves are susceptible to criticism, but short of a massive shift
in the compensation regime to an administrative-agency-type scheme, these values are the best estimates
the parties could have.
128. See Schuck, supra note 9, at 958-59 (arguing that the importance of accurate evaluation of mass
tort claims cannot be overestimated and can be achieved only by maturation of a mass tort).
129. William W. Schwarzer, Settlement of Mass Tort Class Actions: Order out of Chaos, 80 CORNELL
L. REv. 837, 841 (1995) (emphasis added).
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competing claims to the limited fund, if one is found to exist."' 30 Many
courts have used a fairness inquiry as the only test of settlement class
actions-a practice recognized and strongly criticized by the Amchem
Court.' 3' As a result of this lack of standards, judicial approval of mass tort
global settlements has often turned on the outcome of a battle of ethicists-a
clear sign that "the legal process is truly at sea."'132
Devoting most of their attention to the question of fairness, courts
certifying the latest global settlements have virtually ignored a seemingly
critical question: How many future claimants are there?'" They have left
this crucial inquiry out, not because the issue is too uncertain, nor because the
courts are ill-prepared to deal with it for institutional reasons. On the contrary,
courts have dealt with this very question before, even in the mass tort context.
But each time this happened in the past, the mass tort defendant was in
bankruptcy.' 34 The Georgine and Ahearn courts' lack of attention to the size
of the futures' pool-no matter how unjustifiable it may seem-has a simple
explanation. Bankruptcy rules of absolute priority and temporal equality
effectively require courts, when dealing with mass torts, to inquire into the
existence of future claimants and to determine their expected number, N F.'3
Courts have no similar obligations when dealing with class actions-even
limited fund global class actions. All that was required of the Ahearn court, for
130. Marcus, supra note 106, at 880 (emphasis added).
131. See Amchem Prods. Inc. v. Windsor, 117 S. Ct. 2231. 2249 (1997) (cnticizing the practice of
finding certification proper based on the finding that the settlement is fair, and rejecting the conclusion that
a common interest in a fair compromise could satisfy the predominance requirement).
132. Schwarzer, supra note 129, at 841.
133. See Coffee, supra note 3, at 1362 n.60 ("[Nlo effort was made to develop any actuarial estimate
of future claims in the recent asbestos class actions."). This disinterest is hard to understand in Georgne
and impossible to understand in Ahearn. While Georgme was a global settlement, one could argue that.
because it was not a limited fund class action, the estimate of the futures' number was less crucial. The
argument is plausible-but false. The Georgine settlement had many limited fund features. It imposed "case
flow maximums" on the number of claims in each category to be paid each year. These "maximums" were
already set "less than the annual new case filings against the [Georgne] defendants." Georgine v. Amehem
Prods., Inc., 157 F.R.D. 246, 280 (E.D. Pa. 1994). vacated. 83 F.3d 610 (3d Cir. 1996). aff'd sub nora.
Amchem, 117 S. Ct. 2231 (1997). The court recognized the "numbers" issue, but treated it with "casual
disdain." Coffee, supra note 3, at 1362 n.60. The Ahearn court's superfluous treatment of the same problem
is even harder to accept. Ahearn, after all, was a global limited fund class action. Unlike Georgme, it was
not only certified, but also approved on appeal. In its lengthy opinion, the Fifth Circuit devoted one
paragraph to discussion of the expected size of the futures' pool and of the reason why the defendant's
assets were a limited fund. See In re Asbestos Litig. (Flanagan v. Ahearn), 90 F.3d 963, 982 (5th Cir.
1996), vacated, 117 S. Ct. 2503 (1997). The court preceded this with sx pages analyzing the arguments
of legal ethicists. See id. at 977-82. What were the arguments about? They purportedly showed that because
the parties negotiating the settlement had no conflicts of interests, the substantial ct,- and ar-type discounts
of future claims were "fair." Id. at 982.
134. The A.H. Robins Company, National Gypsum Corp., and Johns-Manville Corp. were all bankrupt
when the issue of future claimants arose. See supra note 81.
135. See, e.g., Coffee, supra note 3, at 1458-59. Because the rle of absolute priority requires that tort
claimants receive full payment before stockholders can share in the firm's value, the value of all tort claims
must be established by a bankruptcy court.
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example, was to find that future claimants were numerous enough.36
Paradoxically, once the court was convinced that the futures' claims exceeded
the defendant's assets (i.e., just when it was alerted to the possible futures'
undercompensation), it fulfilled its obligations, at least under the pre-Amchem
class action doctrine, and had no further incentive to scrutinize NF.
This paradox has repeated itself with regard to the value of the defendant
firms. Courts dealing with bankrupt mass tort defendants oversee the process
in which litigants spend considerable time and effort determining defendants'
value.'37 Moreover, in the bankruptcy context, this figure is not just the value
of the firm's assets, A, but the value as a going concern, V. Any reduction in
plaintiffs' recoveries is justified explicitly by the insufficiency of the total
fund, V.'38 The situation is dramatically different, again, when a mass tort
defendant obtains class action treatment. In the absence of workable standards
in Rule 23, nothing prevents a court from finding a limited fund and then
acquiescing in a settlement under which the defendant parts with four percent
of its assets. 39
The system I suggest in this Note provides courts with the needed
standards. The parties favoring a global settlement 4' will have the burden
of persuading the court that the tort is globally mature and that Inequalities (3)
and (4) are true. Because most of the variables in these inequalities will be
known, or can be accurately estimated, all parties will focus their attention on
136. The Fifth Circuit satisfied itself by concluding that, without the settlement, "Fibreboard would
be unable to pay all the valid claims against it within five to nine years." Ahearn, 90 F.3d at 982.
137. See, e.g., In re Johns-Manville Corp., 68 B.R. 618, 620-22 (Bankr. S.D.N.Y. 1986) (describing
a more than four-year-long process in establishing two trusts, one of which would, inter alia, hold 80% of
the stock of the reorganized entity), aff'd in part, rev'd in part, 78 B.R. 407 (Bankr. S.D.N.Y. 1987), aff'd
sub nom. Kane v. Johns-Manville Corp., 843 F.2d 636 (2d Cir. 1988). When mass tort claimants become
owners of a defendant firm, they by this very fact capture the value of the firm. Another process that
effectively reveals the full value of a defendant firm during bankruptcy proceedings is a bidding war
between several potential acquirers of the bankrupt defendant. See, e.g., SOBOL, supra note 67, at 198-209
(describing the bidding for A.H. Robins).
138. See, e.g., In re Joint E. & S. Dist. Asbestos Litig. (Findley v. Blinken), 982 F.2d 721, 725-26 (2d
Cir. 1992) (describing the creation of the original Manville Trust).
139. This was the result in Ahearn. See Coffee, supra note 3, at 1402 (noting that Fibreboard
contributed $10 million of its approximately $250 million assets). Insurance proceeds comprised the bulk
of the settlement fund. See Ahearn, 90 F3d at 971-72. In the district court, Judge Parker briefly treated the
issue in the following way: "There is no authority or reason why Class Counsel may settle a 23(b)(I)(B)
class action only if all of the defendant's resources are included in the settlement. Such a rule would make
no sense, would discourage settlements and has been rejected." Aheam v. Fibreboard Corp., 162 F.R.D.
505, 527 (E.D. Tex. 1995) (citing two district court cases), aff'd sub nora. Ahearn, 90 F.3d 963 (5th Cir.
1996), vacated, 117 S. Ct. 2503 (1997). Issues of authority aside, I respectfully disagree with Judge Parker
about the reason behind the inclusion requirement. As I argue in this Note, the situation is just the reverse:
There is no reason not to include all of the defendant's resources in the settlement process. This does not
mean that all these resources should be used to compensate mass tort claimants, but without considering
them it is impossible to determine whether the time of global settlement has come, or what the appropriate
settlement fund should be.
140. For a discussion of who these parties are likely to be, see infra notes 143-150 and accompanying
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the more uncertain variables: 7, V, and N,."' To be sure, the new inquiry
proposed here will not magically unearth the "true" value of V, or the "true"
number of future claims, NF. But courts will at least be asking the right
questions. Not only will this produce more, and better, research pertaining to
V and NF estimations, but it will also impede the discounting of the futures'
number-something that occurred in both Ahearn and Georgine, while the
courts were listening to the ethicists arguing about "fairness."
This Note proposes a limited fund class action, in part, because this may
be the only type available in view of the extremely demanding predominance
standard enunciated in Ainchern. While the proposed limited fund requirement
differs from the traditional interpretation of Rule 23(b)(1)(B), it has a chance
with the courts. It does not circumvent bankruptcy. It prevents immature global
settlements, and it preserves litigants' autonomy for the longest possible time.
It provides courts with the workable standards that they lack under the current
regime. It focuses courts on the "right" questions, which, when answered,
insure better protection for the futures. Finally, the proposed regime requires
courts to do nothing more than they already do in the similar (but legally
distinct) bankruptcy setting. These are the benefits of the new limited fund
system. To evaluate their full scope, one needs to consider the final aspect of
this Note's proposal-a mandatory class action.
C. A Mandatory Class Action
Making a settlement mandatory is a tough proposal to make. A right to opt
out is probably the greatest guarantee of settlement fairness. Unfortunately, it
is also an extortion tool with which large-claim plaintiffs can delay settlement
negotiations and transfer wealth from small and future claimants. Under the
pre-Amchem law, large-claim plaintiffs had two incentives to avoid global
settlement for as long as possible. First, they benefited the most from
indeterminacy in oa because they held the largest claims. Second, they stood
to receive large punitive damages in the tort system that would be unavailable
in any global settlement. The pro rata rule resolves the first problem. The
mandatory class action addresses the second one. Because punitive damages
are worth millions of dollars, large claimants are likely to accept a settlement
only when their chances for individual adjudication are very low. By then, the
defendant's assets are likely to be depleted, and a global settlement would
differ from bankruptcy only in name. It is irrational to expect that large-claim
plaintiffs would agree to forgo their millions out of the kindness of their
141. One can easily see the close link between the global maturity requirements and the chance for
a reasonably correct evaluation of N, I discuss y-type uncertainties below. See infra notes 165-177 and
accompanying text.
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hearts.'42 A mandatory global settlement is thus necessary to prevent
inequitable dilution of the defendant's funds.
Large-claim plaintiffs seek to prevent a global settlement from coming
too early; defendants and small claimants seek to insure that it does not come
too late. Defendants have already shown an interest in prebankruptcy
settlements. So far, their actions have been either premature'43 or
overdue.'" While the results have been disappointing, the defendants'
increasingly proactive behavior is encouraging. Because a global settlement
class action is not a bankruptcy, the defendant firm retains more of its value
for the shareholders. These shareholders, assured of this benefit if they face
mass tort liability early enough, will have a strong incentive to settle early.
The defendant firm's management would likely be much more receptive to
a global settlement than to bankruptcy as well. There is a considerable stigma
in going bankrupt. 45 A relatively early global settlement would likely result
in much less dissatisfaction with the firm's management. Moreover, such
settlement may be used as a public relations tool demonstrating that the firm
is responsive and responsible. Probably the greatest advantage for the
defendants is that the global settlement encompasses all plaintiffs-something
a bankruptcy cannot offer. 46 Finally, the proposed global settlement regime
allocates the bulk of the external risks to the future plaintiffs, bringing a
finality unmatched by bankruptcy. 47  Thus, under the proposed global
settlement regime, the defendants have numerous incentives not to delay the
global settlement. 48
Small claimants are the second group extremely interested in settling at the
right time. Small claimants have none of the disincentives to strike a global
settlement characteristic of large plaintiffs. They cannot lose huge punitive
142. For an argument that mass tort plaintiffs have ethical obligations toward each other, see Carrie
Menkel-Meadow, Ethics and the Settlements of Mass Torts: When the Rules Meet the Road, 80 CORNELL
L. REV. 1159, 1177 & n.71 (1995).
143. An example of a premature action is the breast implants settlement. See Coffee, supra note 3,
at 1433.
144. See supra text accompanying notes 116-118.
145. For example, a recent study shows that 70% of large reorganizations resulted in a management
change during the pendency of the Chapter I I proceedings. See Lynn M. LoPucki & William C. Whitford,
Patterns in the Bankruptcy Reorganization of Large, Publicly Held Companies, 78 CORNELL L. REV. 597,
610-11 (1993).
146. See infra notes 192-195 and accompanying text.
147. See infra notes 165-177 and accompanying text.
148. To negotiate a global settlement under the proposed regime, defendants need to persuade the court
that Inequality (3) obtains. When there are genuine questions whether this is true (which will typically arise
relatively early in the mass tort maturation), the defendants will have two arguments to aid their cause: that
V is low and, counterintuitively, that Nff is high. It is possible that, thinking ex ante, the defendants will
choose to make both arguments. They will conclude that settling earlier, while arguing for higher N, will
preserve more of the firm's value for the shareholders than settling later, after paying more in punitive
damages, wasting more in transaction costs, and depressing more of the firm's value with mounting
uncertainties. Another reason to settle earlier is a decreased likelihood that NE will be reduced further (by
increasing ix ) before a court focused on the issue. If the proposed regime is adopted and the defendants
can adjust their behavior accordingly, future claimants may gain an unexpected "friend."
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damages awards, nor can they suffer from being denied their day in court.
They can, however, prevent large plaintiffs from depleting defendants' funds
until all that is left is a small portion of their small claims. A mandatory
settlement precludes large claimants from blackmailing small claimants.4 9
When the settlement is mandatory, there is no threat that large plaintiffs will
derail the negotiations by walking away from the settlement. Hence, defendants
need not offer, and small claimants need not agree to, preferential treatment for
large claimants. Small claimants would prefer a nonglobal settlement because
it would allow them, together with large plaintiffs, to transfer wealth from the
unaccounted futures. This option would not appeal to defendants, however,
because their paramount concern is with the resolution of future claims. By
striking a global settlement at the right time, small claimants would get a
higher percentage of their claims than if they were to wait until a defendant's
bankruptcy. As a result, small claimants will be interested in settling as early
as possible.150
The pro rata rule, the principle of basing awards on historic tort system
values, and the mandatory character of the settlement take away the two main
sources of the large plaintiffs' negotiating leverage: opportunities to transfer
wealth from the futures and from the small claimants. In the absence of these
possibilities, the large plaintiffs' opposition may serve only the following
positive functions: (1) preventing global resolution of immature torts; (2)
revealing the most reliable estimate of the number and value of future claims;
and (3) optimizing the scope of claims included in the settlement. With small
claimants pushing for global settlements on one side and defendants anxious
to negotiate on the other, near perfect timing may result.'s
149. Under the current regime, the threat of large claimants' voting with their fect causes the
defendants to structure the deal so that the difference between the large- and small-claim awards under the
settlement is larger than the difference between the respective historic values. See Coffee, supra note 3. at
1450-51 n.431.
150. Because small claimants want to settle earlier rather than later, they are as interested in proving
that Inequality (3) is true as defendants are. Unlike the defendants, the small claimants would rather argue
that N.r is large than that V is small. After all, it is almost certain that under any global settlement plaintiffs
will not receive a full value of their awards in the tort system. Unless such claimants reach a compromise
with defendants allowing the latter to keep a substantial share of V. the defendants will have little incentive
to settle at all. Because the proposed regime gives the defendants "'total peace." if the parties
underestimated V and the defendants thereby kept a larger share of their original value than was anticipated
during the negotiations, none of the added value would go to the plaintiffs. Conversely. if it turns out that
the total value of the plaintiffs' claims was overestimated (because, for example, of overvaluation of N).
the added value would go to increase the plaintiffs awards until they received 100% of their historic values.
and only the remainder would revert to the defendants. Thus, small claimants have a good reason to argue
for a higher /E€ rather than for a lower V.
151. It is now possible to look ex ante at the alignment of interests under the proposed regime.
Defendants and small claimants are interested in a relatively early global settlement, mainly to limit both
transaction costs and multiple punitive damages. Large plaintiffs would prefer to litigate for as long as
possible. They will argue, therefore, that V is high, Nff is low, and Inequality (3) is not yet satisfied. Future
claimants would like both ff, and V to be high. The following table summarizes the panies' negotiating
objectives:
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Yet another benefit produced by the mandatory settlement regime is that
it brings an unmatched certainty to the defendant firm. Uncertainty about
future mass tort liability necessarily depresses the value of the firm, V, and
may even cause the firm's operational collapse.152 Assets will be diverted;
access to capital markets will be restricted; shareholders will forgo worthwhile
projects and will choose inappropriately risky ones instead; customers and
suppliers will flee; and management will be preoccupied with resolving the
firm's financial troubles and dealing with its mass tort problems. All of these
effects will devastate the value of the defendant firm. The proposed regime
insures defendants that when they-perhaps together with small claimants-are
able to show that the tort is globally mature and that Inequalities (3) and (4)
are true, the court will likely accept a negotiated global settlement, and the
defendants' entire future liability will be resolved once and for all. If courts
adopt the proposed regime, the market will include this information in
defendants' stock prices, which will therefore be higher than under conditions
of uncertainty. Thus, the proposed regime will produce a net surplus in the
value of defendant firms.
In addition, the proposed regime would prohibit back-end opt outs. It
seems plainly inconsistent to deny a right to opt out for the present claimants,
but to leave it for future ones. Nonetheless, several scholars have argued in
favor of this arrangement.'53 I disagree. First, allowing future plaintiffs to opt
out is unfair to the futures themselves. It would allow near futures to deplete
the defendant's funds' 4 and to "rob" intermediate and far futures by opting
out and obtaining huge awards in the tort system. Considering that a
DEFENDANTS SMALL LARGE FUTURE
CLAIMANTS CLAIMANTS CLAIMANTS
Argue that V is: low high high high
Argue that/N r is: high high, low high
The table demonstrates several things. First, parties other than the futures themselves are interested in
arguing for a high NF and V. Second, when all parties are at the negotiating table (futures through a
representative), there are advocates both for and against high and low values for Nf4 and V. If one believes
that an adversarial system facilitates truthfinding, this is a good result. Finally, understanding of the parties'
interests enables us to predict possible dynamics of future negotiations.
The table is, of course, a simplification. Moreover, it assumes that negotiations are timely. If the
negotiations begin too late, both defendants and small claimants would prefer to argue that N, is small,
thereby "stealing" from the futures. Nonetheless, under my proposal there are at least some circumstances
when futures' interests align with those of one or more present parties. This never happened under the pre-
Amchem class action law.
152. See, e.g., Roe, supra note 90, at 856-62 (describing the operational collapse of firms facing
unresolved mass tort claims).
153. Professor Coffee, for example, has made a proposal to combine a mandatory class action at the
liability stage with deferred limited opt-out rights. See Coffee, supra note 3, at 1446-53.
154. Protection of defendants' funds against depletion by present claimants is one of the central issues
of contemporary debate. See generally Symposium, Mass Tortes: Serving Up Just Desserts, 80 CORNELL
L. REv. 811 (1995). Professor Coffee argues that unrestricted present claimants "will deplete virtually any
settlement fund in short order, leaving future claimants empty-handed." Coffee, supra note 3, at 1387.
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mandatory class action denies this advantage to the present claimants, one
cannot justify bestowing it on the near futures. Second, providing for back-end
opt outs from a mandatory class is unfair to the present plaintiffs because it
subordinates their autonomy to that of the future claimants.' 55 Moreover,
back-end opt outs are a strange way to preserve the futures' autonomy. The
proposed regime achieves this by avoiding the global settlement for as long as
possible. This allows some of the future claimants to become present plaintiffs
and to use the tort system to assert their individual rights. When the settlement
moment is reached, however, every' litigant, present or future, must sacrifice
his or her autonomy as a condition of obtaining a meaningful recovery. Finally,
back-end opt outs are a bad idea because they create a false illusion that
futures will receive substantial benefits. Except for rare occasions attributable
to peculiar circumstances,' 56 the extreme limitations placed on back-end opt-
out rights make these rights illusory, if not nonexistent. 57 Professor Schuck,
a proponent of deferred opt outs, admits that it is doubtful that courts can
deduce general principles to guide them in reviewing the fairness of the
conditions placed on back-end opt outs. 58 In the absence of such principles,
back-end opt outs can be (and indeed are) used to defend indefensible
155. The ability of back-end opt outs to preserve futures' autonomy is probably the most popular
argument in favor of this procedural device. See, e.g., Coffee, supra note 3. at 1447 (calling litigant
autonomy "a value normally deserving considerable constitutional weight"): Schuck. supra note 9. at 964
(calling the institutionalization and enlargement of claimant autonomy a "highly desirable and important
innovation for the emergent mass tort system"). The preference for the futures' autonomy is either expressly
explained or supported by an implicit recognition that present claimants receive higher benefits from global
settlements than do the futures. The proposed regime attacks the problem at its root-it insures that the
benefits are equal (including appropriate discounts). This makes the indirect compensation via back-cnd
opt outs unnecessary.
156. See, e.g., Bowling v. Pfizer, Inc., 143 RR.D. 141, 170 (S.D. Ohio 1992) (binding in a settlement
only small claimants (both present and future) who had the defendant's heart valve, yet suffered no
noticeable physical injury from it). The unique feature of the settlement approved in Bowling is an absolute
freedom to opt out reserved for claimants who move into the large plaintiff category because of a falure
of their valves. See id. at 150.
157. Back-end opt-out provisions almost always deny the nght to claim punitive damages. See. e.g..
In re Asbestos Litig. (Flanagan v. Ahearn), 90 F.3d 963, 973 (5th Cir. 1996) (noting that the settlement
precluded punitive damages), vacated, 117 S. Ct. 2503 (1997). The number of claimants who can exit each
year is limited, often to a minuscule percentage of the total number of plaintiffs. See. e g. Georginc v.
Amchem Prods., Inc., 83 F.3d 610, 620 (3d Cir. 1996) (describing stnct limits on "extraordinary" claims
and caps on non-"extraordinary" claims paid out according to a settlement). aff'd sub nom. Amchem Prods.,
Inc., v. Windsor, 117 S. Ct. 2231 (1997). Claimants must go through one or several alternative dispute
resolution proceedings before a court hearing becomes available. See. e.g.. Ahearn. 90 F.3d at 972-73. Any
award obtained in court is capped by a certain amount, see. e.g., id. at 973 (citing a S500,000 cap on
recovery in the tort system and preclusion of recovery of punitive damages), and even this award is paid
over an extended period, see id. Finally, attorneys' fees are limited. See id. It is undeniably true that "(iit
is not a matter of semantics, not a matter of whether the talismanic word 'opt-out' is used but whether the
right given exists in effect." In re A.H. Robins Co., 880 F.2d 709. 745 (4th Cir. 1989) (citing Walters v.
National Ass'n of Radiation Survivors, 473 U.S. 305, 321 (1985)). But it is equally true that, as the
restrictions accumulate, the back-end opt out looks more and more like no opt out at all. semantically or
substantively.
158. See Schuck, supra note 9, at 967.
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settlements. To preclude this "window dressing,"'159 as well as for the other
reasons mentioned above, the proposed regime precludes back-end opt outs.
A mandatory settlement is not a preferred way of compensating victims in
the American tort system. It denies individual litigants a right to their "day in
court," it reduces the plaintiff's bargaining power and eliminates the
opportunity to reject the settlement, and it is a potentially dangerous weapon
in defendants' hands. On the other hand, a limited fund mandatory global
settlement has many advantages. It prevents premature global settlements based
on nonexistent or highly uncertain claim values. It aligns the interests of
different mass tort participants in a way that is likely to result in the optimal
timing of the settlement and the optimal balance between those included and
excluded (at least temporarily) from it. The regime precludes large plaintiffs
from obtaining disproportionately favorable treatment at the expense of small
and future claimants. It ends an intolerable situation in which some victims
receive millions in punitive damages while thousands of others are left with
no compensation at all. It ends the attempts to avoid bankruptcy by negotiating
global settlements whose time has passed. It increases the value of the
defendant firm by eliminating uncertainties about its future liabilities. Finally,
it helps courts in evaluating proposed settlements.
D. Modifications to the Pro Rata Rule
I propose two modifications to the pro rata rule, one procedural and one
substantive. Both are designed to provide further protection for future
claimants. With respect to procedure, I suggest periodic judicial review and,
possibly, revaluation of claims. A representative of any party would be able
to initiate this review upon showing that such party's expected recoveries have
dropped below a certain percentage of their original values." ° When the
court, after hearing from all concerned, certifies that this devaluation has
indeed occurred, all unpaid awards would be ratcheted down proportionately.
The modification would bring several benefits. First, it would reduce the
potential gain reaped by the present claimants from understating NF.'161
159. Ahearn, 90 F.3d at 1007 n.30 (Smith, J., dissenting).
160. It is most likely that such parties will be future claimants.
161. This is so because earlier plaintiffs' awards will be reduced, not late in the game when there is
no cash in the settlement fund, but much earlier, when the expectation about the remaining liabilities
changes. There are other ways to make both present plaintiffs and defendants more sensitive to
undervaluing future claims. For example, instead of paying present claimants in full, the settlement could
provide for annuity-type payments such that the present value of the annuity equals the total award amount.
Combined with the ongoing revaluation technique, this would effectively hold the unpaid portion of the
earlier plaintiffs' claims as insurance against devaluation of the later claimants' awards. An even stronger
measure might be to do the same with the plaintiffs' counsel fees (which, in the Georgine case, could have
exceeded $100 million). See Koniak, supra note 49, at 1067. There are other ways to make both present
plaintiffs and defendants more sensitive to undervaluing future claims. A detailed discussion of such
alternatives is beyond the scope of this Note.
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Second, it would give the futures' representative both the incentive to monitor
the futures' numbers and the power to act when undervaluation has become
clear.162 Third, if a court knows ex ante that if it approves an underfunded
settlement it would have to deal with the problem again and again, the court
would have a strong incentive to do it right the first time. 163 Finally, the
procedure would contribute to the accumulation of institutional knowledge,
which would be extremely helpful for the next mass tort global settlement.'6
The substantive modification to the pro rata rule would account for
additional uncertainties external to a particular mass tort. These uncertainties
are caused by inflation, as well as possible future changes in medicine and
science, legal rules, social valuations, and social insurance regimes. The
premium coefficient y reflects uncertainties created by all these changes. Both
evaluating these uncertainties and assigning their risks to a particular party
present serious problems.
The problem with inflation is that it is hard to predict. Some mass tort
negotiators have tried, but their experiences have not been encouraging. In the
National Gypsum bankruptcy, for example, the courts adopted a three to four
percent annual inflation rate for future settlement values.'5 Not only did this
rate fall below the actual rate of inflation, the rate arguably should have been
set at least in part with a view toward inflation in the medical industry, where
cost increases are typically twice or even three times the inflation rate.166
Changes in medicine and science can dramatically affect the fairness or
reasonableness of future awards as well. When a mass tort is mature, the
defendant's liability is well established. Because future discoveries can only
162. This presumes that the court will retain the futures' representative for as long as there are future
claimants. It also presumes that such a representative will be compensated enough to provide ongoing
vigorous representation.
163. There is considerable evidence showing that the judges who handle mass tort cases often reach
a point when they become personally interested in settling the dispute. See. e.g.. Ahearn. 90 F.3d at 971
(describing critical negotiations at Judge Parker's home and later at a nearby coffee shop); SCHuK. supra
note 98, at 143-67 (describing the extraordinary efforts of Judge Weinstein to settle the Agent Orange ease);
SOBOL, supra note 67, at 44-45 (describing a critical decision in the Dalkon Shield case reached in Judge
Merhige's home). Judges who spend this much time and effort settling cases are unlikely to be pleased
when they come back. On the other hand, to the extent the judges feel responsible for gross undervaluations
under their supervision, the proposed procedural modification will allow them to deal with the problem
more easily. See, e.g., In re Joint E. & S. Dist. Asbestos Litig. (Findley v. Blinken), 982 F2d 721. 727 (2d
Cir. 1992) (describing the Herculean efforts of Judge Weinstein to reopen the Manville Trust settlement
single-handedly).
164. A significant part of this institutional knowledge would come from continual reassessment of the
adequacy of original and subsequent valuations of the expected number of future claims.
165. See DUNBAR & NEUMANN, supra note 83, at 31.
166. See Mike Causey, HMOs May Be Best Route. WASH. POST. Aug. 18, 1995. at B2. While health
care expenses per capita grew at about 9% annually from 1950 to 1995. the Consumer Price Index (CPI)
increased at a rate of only 4.5%. See Karen Davis. Medicare: Options for the Long Term. in POUCY
OPTIONS FOR REFORMING THE MEDICARE PROGRAM 113. 115 (Stuart H. Altman et a]. eds.. 1997). On the
other hand, during the 1993-1995 period, health care expenses grew at a rate of 5.5% and the CPI at 2.8%.
See id. In 1994, national health care expenditures grew more slowly than Gross Domestic Product. See id.
It is hard to know what is responsible for the recent slowdown in private health outlays or whether ttus
trend is permanent or temporary.
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negate this liability, it seems that y should be negative to account for possible
future decreases in the certainty of the defendant's fault. 167 A closer
examination shows that an increase in liability is also possible. It is known
today, for example, that a special kind of cancer, malignant mesothelioma, is
caused almost exclusively by asbestos. 6  Diseases falling into a category
typically called "other cancer' 69 can be caused by asbestos or other factors,
some of which are unknown. Plaintiffs' awards account for that difference:
They are higher for mesothelioma victims because causation for them is certain
while for the "other cancer" victims it is not.170 Assume that five years from
now scientists discover that a special subsection of "other cancer" can only be
caused by asbestos exposure, and it turns out that eighty percent of the "other
cancer" victims exposed to asbestos have this particular type of cancer. The
award schedule based on today's science would have undercompensated "other
cancer" sufferers after the discovery. Changes in science and medicine can thus
lead to both over- and undercompensation of future plaintiffs. As with
inflation, it is impossible to predict which party will benefit from these
changes in the aggregate.
Judicial and legislative actions of the past decades substantially changed
tort law.'7' There is no reason to think that the trend will not continue.
Because the values of current claims are based on existing legal rules, future
change in those rules will make the values obsolete. For example, most states
follow the doctrine of contributory negligence. It is well established that
smoking greatly increases the risk of lung cancer in persons exposed to
asbestos. Today's mean recovery value for a lung cancer victim who had
asbestos exposure is therefore reduced. The reduction accounts for the fact that
some litigants lose their cases against asbestos manufacturers (or have their
judgments substantially decreased) when they have a history of smoking.
Assume that ten years from now the contributory fault defense is abandoned.
Persons whose future recoveries are based on the outdated law would be
undercompensated. The opposite example is just as possible.
Another variable that is very hard to estimate is change in social
valuations. Examples are easy to find. The first Dalkon Shield verdict in 1975
167. Such a decrease seems to be taking place in the breast implants litigation. See supra note 123.
168. See Schuck, supra note 20, at 546-47.
169. E.g., Coffee, supra note 3, at 1395-96 (using the "other cancer" category).
170. For an example of the awards schedules in two asbestos-related settlements, see id. at 1395-96.
Recoveries by the "other cancer" victims were scheduled to be 80% less than by the mesothelioma victims.
See id.
171. Courts have expanded categories of compensable harms to include fear of future injury, medical-
monitoring costs, and exposure-only nonimpairing conditions, see, e.g., Schuck, supra note 9, at 947 &
n.25, while simultaneously limiting defenses, see, e.g., In re "Agent Orange" Prod. Liab. Litig., 996 F.2d
1425, 1436 (2d Cir. 1993) (acknowledging that the government contractor defense had been limited since
the resolution of the original case). For a look at recent legislative changes in the law of torts, see Mark
Thompson, Letting the Air out of Tort Reform, A.B.A. J., May 1997, at 64.
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awarded the plaintiff $85,000."' Ten years later, comparable plaintiffs were
routinely awarded millions of dollars. 73 Dow Coming lost its first verdict
to a breast implants plaintiff in 1977, costing the company $170,000.17 In
1991, a federal jury awarded another breast implants plaintiff $7.3 million.,
Some of the increase in awards in each example was a result of inflation, but
clearly not all of it. There may be good reason to expect that societal
valuations will only increase in the future. Even assuming that this is true,
there is hardly any basis for educated estimates about how fast such valuations
will change for each particular injury covered by the settlement.
Yet another uncertainty comes from possible changes in social insurance
mechanisms. If, for example, the United States were to adopt universal medical
coverage, any settlement that awards medical-monitoring costs would be
overcompensating the plaintiffs. On the other hand, if government-sponsored
disability insurance were to become unavailable, awards determined in its
presence would be too low. Again, it is probably more likely that change will
be toward more social insurance than less. Again, it is impossible to predict
when or if such change will occur and what its nature will be.
These are just some of the contingencies impounded in Y. It is not hard to
recognize their existence, but it is hard to allocate the risk of their occurrence.
Modem settlements like Georgine and Ahearn simply ignore these risks,
effectively placing their burden on future plaintiffs. We should at least consider
the alternatives. First, to the extent that any of these risks may be estimated
with a reasonable degree of certainty at the time of global settlement
negotiations, the court should adjust y when it considers Inequality (3).
Inflation seems to be the most likely candidate. 76 Second, perhaps in the
future some other contingencies will become more predictable. When these
contingencies materialize, the future claimants' representative should inform
the court, which should adjust the awards accordingly.'" Ultimately,
however, y-type risks will usually be extremely hard to predict. Yet they must
be allocated.
Until now, I have argued for increased protection for future claimants. I
now reverse myself and suggest allocating y-type risks, with the two
172. See In re A.H. Robins Co., 880 F.2d 709, 711 (3d Cir. 1989).
173. See id. at 715.
174. See West's Legal News: Torts and Personal Injury: Breast Implants Pathfinder, supra note 123.
at *3.
175. See id.
176. Among the y-risks, inflation can be evaluated with the highest degree of certainty. It is therefore
not surprising that both courts and scholars have focused their attention on this "t-factor. See. e.g.. Amchem
Prods., Inc. v. Windsor, 117 S. Ct. 2231, 2251 (1997); Coffee. supra note 3. at 1459.
177. Such modification should clearly take place, for example, if Congress were to adopt universal
health coverage and the settlement provides for medical-monitoring costs. The procedural modification to
the pro rata rule already presupposes a continuous monitoring by the futures' representative and a possible
readjustment of the awards. It provides a convenient framework to monitor and adjust for future changes
in 7-type risks.
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exceptions described above, to future plaintiffs. Several reasons bring me to
this decision. First, under the proposed regime, futures would recover much
higher portions of their claims than they have received under the Georgine-
type settlements. In part, the surplus would come from reducing present
plaintiffs' recoveries; in part, it would come from the defendants. Georgine-
type settlements provide no protection from the y-type uncertainties at all.
Changing to the proposed regime while placing the 7-type risk on the futures
would still make them much better off. Second, defendants are much less
likely to accept a global settlement and lose a substantial part of their wealth
while being far away from bankruptcy without a guarantee of "total
peace."'t78 Total peace means no future liability regardless of any future
contingencies, including y-type risks. Third, the history of mass tort settlements
is too short to estimate reliably the overall effect of the changes discussed
above. It is not clear whether future claimants will, on average, benefit or lose
from taking on y-risks. Therefore, I suggest the following: y should be defined
to reflect reasonable inflation protection and any other contingency that can be
reasonably estimated at the time of the settlement. When 7Y-type risks
materialize in the future, courts may, if the change is certain enough, readjust
the awards to the remaining plaintiffs. All other contingencies discussed above
should be allocated to the future plaintiffs.
IV. WHY NOT BANKRUPTCY?
Many commentators have argued that bankruptcy gives futures more
procedural and substantive protection than the pre-Amchem global settlement
class actions. 7 9 For a reorganization plan to be approved, the argument goes,
it must be put to a vote of all members of impaired classes of creditors, 180
the vote is taken only after a solicitation based on a detailed description of the
plan,' 8' the plan can be "crammed down" over the objection of a dissenting
class only if strict fairness standards are met, 82 and the plan may not be
imposed against the wishes of an impaired class that would fare better under
liquidation.'83 Unlike a class representative whose fee completely depends
on the success of the settlement, a lawyer for a creditors' committee is
compensated independently. Nevertheless, the fact that bankruptcy gives future
178. In re Asbestos Litig. (Flanagan v. Aheam), 90 F.3d 963, 970 (5th Cir. 1996) (stating that the
principal defendant "made it clear from the beginning that it would only entertain a global settlement if the
settlement brought 'total peace'), vacated, 117 S. Ct. 2503 (1997).
179. See sources cited supra note 23.
180. See II U.S.C. § 1126 (1994).
181. See id. § 1125.
182. See id. § 1129(b)(1).
183. See id. § 1129(a)(7).
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claimants substantial procedural and substantive protection does not
automatically make bankruptcy the best possible alternative.'8
To begin with, the experience of the past decade has shown that the
bankruptcy solution is "neither cheap nor final.""' 5 The Johns-Manville
bankruptcy did not preclude Judge Weinstein from requesting more funds from
the newly organized Manville Corp. when the trust created to compensate tort
claimants proved to be inadequately funded.&6 Although the Second Circuit
reversed Judge Weinstein's decision, it expressed doubt that the bankruptcy
laws alone could effectively deal with the problem of mass tort future
claimants.187 Another lesson learned from the asbestos and the Dow Coming
bankruptcies is that late plaintiffs recover only a minuscule percentage of their
claims.'88 Lack of finality, inadequate funding, sharp devaluation of awards,
and many other reasons make an early reorganization desirable.'" The
problem is that no party empowered to initiate reorganization has the incentive
to do so.' 90 The situation is dramatically different under the proposed global
settlement regime. Both defendants and small claimants have numerous
incentives to start settlement negotiations long before the firm's liabilities
exceed its assets (and Inequality (4) becomes false).' Early settlement also
benefits the futures, because they recover larger portions of their claims (than
in bankruptcy), as the depletion of the defendant's assets by repetitive punitive
damages awards ends relatively early.
Another advantage of the proposed regime over bankruptcy is the
completeness of its treatment of future claims. Future claimants are treated in
bankruptcy in two different ways. To the extent their claims are recognized,
they benefit from the pro rata rule. Many of them, however, are not
recognized. 92 As the court explained in Ahearn, "[C]ourts that have allowed
representation of future tort claimants have left them in an uncertain position
184. Cf. Thomas A. Smith, A Capital Markets Approach to Mass Tort Bankruptw). 104 YALE L.J. 367.
382-89 (1994) (discussing underestimation, and thus undercompensation. of claims in mass tort
bankruptcies).
185. Coffee, supra note 3, at 1388 (describing the Johns-Manvillc bankruptcy).
186. See In re Joint E. & S. Dist. Asbestos Litig. (Findley v. Blinken). 982 F.2d 721. 725-28 (2d Cir.
1992).
187. See id. at 753.
188. Just before Dow Coming filed for Chapter 1I, the plaintiffs could count on. at best. 12% to 16%
of their originally scheduled benefits and, at worst, less than 5%. See Coffee, supra note 3. at 1408. The
share of the original claim values payable by the Manville Trust was 10%. See In re Joint E & S. Dist,
Asbestos Litig. (Keene Corp. v. Fiorelli), 78 F3d 764, 770 (2d Cit. 1996).
189. See Roe, supra note 90, at 905.
190. See id. at 905-17.
191. See supra notes 143-150 and accompanying text.
192. Recent decisions have held that there must be some "prepetition relationship" between future
claimants and the bankrupt defendant in order for the future claimants to have standing. Epstein v- Official
Comm. of Unsecured Creditors of the Estate of Piper Aircraft Corp.. 58 F.3d 1573. 1577 (11 th Cir. 1995).
Other courts use a more liberal "conduct test," under which a right to payment arises when the conduct
giving rise to the alleged liability has occurred. See id. Even these courts, however, presume some
prepetition relationship between the debtor's conduct and the claimant. See id. at 1576-77.
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that falls short of full 'creditor' status."'t93 Thus, "it was and remains unclear
whether [future claimants] constitute creditors who hold claims within the
meaning of section 101(4) of the Bankruptcy Code."' 94 In view of this
uncertainty, futures will prefer a guaranteed recovery from the settlement fund
(albeit lower than that available in the tort system) to the unclear litigation
prospects left for those whose claims are excluded from the bankruptcy
proceeding.95 While individual futures' recoveries from the fund will be
lower than in the tort system, their expected recoveries (and their overall
recovery as a class) will be higher due to the great indeterminacy of receiving
a future award in the courts.
Counterintuitively, defendants will also prefer to include the future
claimants in a global settlement, despite their higher overall recovery. Leaving
some "extra" futures with potential claims against the reorganized entity would
place the entire burden of their compensation on the entity. Placing these
claims in the global settlement would allow defendants to shift at least part of
this burden to present plaintiffs whose recoveries would be reduced to satisfy
the pro rata rule. The most likely source of extra cash would be the funds that
would have otherwise been spent on punitive damages awards.
The proposed solution is thus preferable to bankruptcy because, unlike
bankruptcy, it creates incentives to negotiate a settlement early enough. It
prevents a wasteful depletion of the defendant's resources; it brings greater
certainty to both the defendants and the futures; and it preserves higher
recoveries for the future plaintiffs.
V. CONCLUSION
The Supreme Court recently broke its long silence in the area of mass
torts. It refused to go along with the "adventuresome" use of Rule 23,196
without which, commentators had argued, secure, fair, and efficient
compensation of asbestos victims would be impossible. The Court's
emphatically broad statement that any global mass tort class action would not
satisfy Rule 23(b)(3)'s predominance prong, the Court's skepticism of
inventory settlements with awards different from those in the global settlement,
and the Court's express concern about inflation protection all suggest that at
least one of the main reasons behind its decision was its concern about
inadequate protection of future claimants by current class action mechanisms.
193. In re Asbestos Litig. (Flanagan v. Ahearn), 90 F.3d 963, 985 (5th Cir. 1996), vacated, 117 S. Ct.
2503 (1997).
194. In re Joint E. & S. Dist. Asbestos Litig. (Findley v. Blinken), 982 F.2d 721, 752 (2d Cir. 1992)
(Feinberg, J., concurring in part and dissenting in part) (internal quotations omitted).
195. Notably, in the Piper Aircraft bankruptcy it was the future claimants' representative who argued
for their inclusion in the Piper creditors' ranks. See Epstein, 58 F.3d at 1575.
196. Amchem Prods., Inc. v. Windsor, 117 S. Ct. 2231, 2247 (1997).
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Future Claimants
In this Note, I have argued in favor of a regime that could (1) provide for a
fair and efficient resolution of mass tort claims; (2) give more protection to
future claimants; and (3) satisfy the Court's requirements of structural and
substantive protection under Rule 23(a). I have called this regime a global
limited fund mandatory settlement class action with a modified pro rata
distribution of benefits for present and future claimants.
The regime rests on the claim that pro rata distribution between similarly
situated present and future claimants is both fair and responsive to the Court's
concerns. It increases certainty and eliminates the costs of opportunistic
behavior. It is also consistent with the law of bankruptcy. Several
modifications to the pro rata rule aim at protecting the futures from external
risks, most notably inflation. There are two main prerequisites for a successful
global settlement. First, the mass tort must be globally mature. Second, the
present value of present and future claims must exceed the going concern value
of the defendant firm, while the firm's assets must exceed its liabilities. When
this occurs, a mandatory limited fund global settlement under Rule 23(b)(1)(B)
should follow.197 This procedural solution has a better chance of judicial
approval in light of the Amchem holding and analysis; it provides for optimal
timing; and, above all, it gives unmatched protection to future claimants.
Many critical issues remain to be considered. I have concentrated on only
what I perceived to be the critical questions that must be resolved before any
other issues arise. Is the class action device still available to resolve mature
mass torts? Despite the Amchem decision, I think it is. Should it be possible
to strike deals like Georgine and Ahearn where present plaintiffs receive
greater amounts than future claimants with identical injuries only because the
latter were too late to file a claim or too "unfortunate" not to become injured
early enough? The Supreme Court has said no, not these kinds of deals. There
are, however, alternatives. One of them is suggested in this Note. Many more
197. To be sure, all of these conditions may not obtain for every mass ton. Yet. ironically, they did
obtain in the very case considered by the Supreme Court. The situation was npe for the global settlement
under the proposed regime just before the Georgine deal and the accompanying inventory settlements were
negotiated. Asbestos was clearly the most mature mass tort. Information about future claimants was
sufficient to classify it as globally mature. While several asbestos manufacturers had gone bankrupt, all 19
Georgine defendants were financially viable companies. See Konak. sutpra note 49. at 1047 Yet all parties
involved in the case, including class representatives, the plaintiffs' bar. defendants. and the Georgme court
itself, were concerned about defendants' possible future bankruptcies. See id. at 1099-100 (cittng testimony
by various parties regarding their concerns about future liability as well as the concerns of the Geargine
court). In other words, there was probably a good chance that both Inequalities (3) and (4) 'were true Thus.
Georgine is an existing example that a real mass tort may satisfy the requirements of the proposed regime.
Moreover, there is a reason to expect that more mass torts will reach global maturity tn the future than have
ir the past. Many earlier mass torts never globally matured (and went straight into bankruptcy) because of
unlimited awards and relaxed substantive doctrines. All of these rules are under attack today. See
Thompson, supra note 171, at 65. As the states limit punitive damages, cap noneconomic awards, and
modify their rules prohibiting juries from learning of collateral sources for paying damages, it becomes
more and more likely that defendant firms will remain financially viable for a considerable time after their
total liabilities (including those to future claimants) begin to exceed their value as a going concern
Therefore, more firms will be able to satisfy the requirements of the proposed regime.
1998] 2581
The Yale Law Journal [Vol. 107: 2545
will appear as mass tort scholars reflect on the Court's decision. There is still
a future for future claimants after Amchem Products, Inc. v. Windsor.
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